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TARGETING WORKPLACE CONTEXT:
TITLE VII AS A TOOL FOR INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM
Tristin K. Green*
INTRODUCTION

Discrimination in the workplace today is increasingly less a problem
of overt employer policies or targeted discriminatory animus than it is
a problem of subtle, often unconscious, bias creeping into everyday
social interactions and judgments on the job.'
In fact, modern
discrimination, both in the workplace and in other areas of social life,
is often described as a cognitive problem, a problem of persistent
biased categories and schemas in our minds.2 And yet, individuals do
not act in isolation. Individuals discriminate, but they do so in
situated context. Their discriminatory decisions take place as part of a
complex web of interrelated social expectancies and taken-for-granted
institutionalized practices that influence their interpretations,
constrain their options, and normalize their outcomes. Even as we
recognize its complex human dimensions at the individual level, then,

* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I presented an
earlier version of this paper at the 2003 Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum. I am
indebted to the Forum's participants-particularly Deborah Hensler and Judith
Resnik-for their helpful feedback. I also received invaluable comments at various
stages of the project from Michelle Adams, Carl Coleman, Howard Erichson, Rachel
Godsil, Solangel Maldonado, and Charles Sullivan, as well as from the participants in
the summer lunch series at Seton Hall. Thanks also to Stacy Manobianca and John
Nachlinger for research assistance and to the Seton Hall University School of Law
Summer Research Stipend Program for financial support.
1. A number of scholars have detailed various aspects of the shifting nature of
discrimination from the overt to the more subtle. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995); Katherine V.W. Stone,
The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor
and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 519 (2001); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination:A StructuralApproach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001);
see also Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 91
(2003).
2. See Confronting Racism: The Problem and the Response (Jennifer L.
Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998); Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism (John
F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986); Krieger, supra note 1, at 1186-1211.
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we must also recognize that discrimination is equally an institutional
and organizational problem.
In the past decade, courts have seen an increase in the filing of
private class action lawsuits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act3
that allege widespread employment discrimination facilitated by
organizational structures, workplace cultures, and institutionalized
practices. In this Article, I argue that these lawsuits represent the
emergence of an important new form of private institutional reform
litigation in which plaintiffs seek organizational change that will
reduce the incidence of discrimination by individuals and groups in
the workplace by altering the context in which decisions are made. I
outline some of the basic characteristics of this litigation and consider
its potential to effect meaningful antidiscrimination reform. By
focusing primarily on the procedural and remedial contours of these
lawsuits rather than on the particular doctrinal formulation of
substantive legal theories, I seek to consider the implications of the
complexity inherent in the problem of modern workplace
discrimination for the task of identifying its sources and of devising
programs for reform.4
The Article is organized into three main parts. I begin in Part I with
a brief discussion of the importance of identifying and remedying
sources of discrimination at the institutional and organizational as well
as at the group and individual level. Drawing from the recent work of
organizational and socio-legal scholars, I argue that the complex,
situated nature of human action has tremendous consequence for the
way that we think about and attempt to solve the problem of modern
workplace discrimination. Individuals still serve as an important point
of inquiry, but larger organizational decision-making structures,
workplace cultures, and informal, institutionalized practices become
equally important. Without attention to the context and complexity
of decision making, an individual instance of discrimination may be
resolved while the structures, cultures, and practices that facilitated
that discrimination in the first place remain unchanged.
In Part II of the Article I turn more specifically to Title VII lawsuits
as a mechanism for generating the type of institutional, and/or
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15
(2000) [hereinafter Title VII].
4. This Article builds on my earlier work, with a shift in emphasis. In
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate
Treatment Theory, I argued that existing Title VII doctrine fails adequately to address
much of modern workplace discrimination. See Green, supra note 1. I suggested that,
particularly given ongoing changes in the nature of discrimination and in the nature of
the employment relationship, the substantive legal inquiry should move toward
recognizing the interplay between individuals and the organizations and environments
within which they work. Specifically, I proposed a structural form of disparate
treatment theory aimed at holding employers responsible for the organizational
structures, institutional practices, and workplace dynamics that enable discrimination
in their workplaces.
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organizational inquiry needed for meaningful change. I begin this
part by tracing the public and private dimensions of the early Title VII
civil rights enforcement regime, the individualization/privatization of
Title VII litigation over time, and the recent rise in private class
actions seeking widespread institutional reform. I then take these
recent class actions as a starting point for an effort to define the basic
characteristics of modern institutional reform litigation under Title
VII. I suggest that these lawsuits, although similar to earlier Title VII
institutional reform efforts, differ in significant ways that may affect
their ability to effect meaningful reform.
In Part III, I move from the descriptive to the evaluative to consider
the potential of these lawsuits for broadening the legal inquiry to
include organizational sources of harm. The large money stakes
involved in many recent cases make it tempting to view the cases as
just another form of mass tort, wherein the parties bargain to place a
price on the risk of workplace discrimination. It would be a mistake,
however, to ignore the institutional reform dimension of these
lawsuits. Indeed, it is the search for institutional reform that helps
make clear that the organization itself, and not just individual decision
makers, can be a cause of even some of the more subtle forms of
discrimination found in the modern workplace. Once understood as
attempts to identify and address organizational sources of
discrimination, these lawsuits fit nicely within the existing class action
paradigm, for the organizational cause of the discrimination rather
than the precise nature of the injury suffered forms the common
question for class treatment.
In Part IV of the Article, I then turn to consider some of the
hazards of this new form of institutional reform litigation. Again, the
complexity of the problem surfaces to inform the analysis, this time
revealing the multi-dimensional, collaborative nature of the remedial
process needed for change, and raising concern about private cooption of larger public antidiscrimination goals. I argue in this part
that, unlike some of the more traditional, early Title VII efforts at
institutional reform, the contextual nature of the problem of modern
workplace discrimination requires a similarly contextualized solution.
There simply is no single answer that will work in all organizations to
eliminate institutionalized forms of discrimination. This is true to
some extent for all organizational reform, but I suggest that it is
particularly true in the modern employment discrimination context,
where the legal objective is, in large part at least, to change the
structures, cultures, and practices of the workplace in ways that will
reduce the operation of subtle, often unconscious, discriminatory bias
in the decision making of individuals. This interrelation between
organizational structures, institutionalized practices, and individuals
adds a layer of complexity that is not equally apparent in early Title
VII institutional reform, where efforts were aimed primarily at
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structural changes with immediate, easily observable rather than
secondary or indefinite effect. Drawing once again on socio-legal
research and theory, I argue that the need for a flexible,
contextualized, ongoing remedial process leads to an increased risk of
private co-option of larger public goals that may be exacerbated by a
purely private resolution of lawsuits like the ones recently filed.
I. COMPLEXITY AND CAUSATION: THE PROBLEM

The importance of recent Title VII class action litigation lies in its
ability to reach some of the more subtle forms of discrimination
common in the modern workplace by altering the context in which
decisions are made.
In this part, I draw on a variety of
interdisciplinary research and scholarship to highlight the role of
institutions and other organizational context in perpetuating
workplace inequity and to illustrate the need for an antidiscrimination
inquiry that extends beyond individual decision makers to include
larger intra- and inter-organizational practices and structures.
A. OrganizationalInfluence on Decision Making
Research and theory in the disciplines of sociology and social
psychology have long emphasized the situated nature of human
thought and action. At the micro-level, cognitive psychologists have
amassed a large body of evidence that suggests contextual influences
on cognitive biases and stereotyping.' People perceive, categorize, and
5. Social cognition theory, one area of study within cognitive psychology, focuses
on how people make sense of themselves and the social world. See, e.g., Susan T.
Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition (1991); see also Culture in Mind: Toward
a Sociology of Culture and Cognition (Karen A. Cerulo ed., 2002) (compiling efforts
to analyze cognition in its sociocultural context). Some research in social cognition
has focused specifically on the cognitive and contextual aspects of discrimination. See,
e.g., William T. Bielby, Minimizing Workplace Gender and RacialBias, 29 Contemp.
Soc. 120 (2000) (reviewing recent studies of contextual influence on decision making);
Marilynn B. Brewer et al., Diversity and OrganizationalIdentity: The Problem of
Entr&e after Entry, in Cultural Divides: Understanding and Overcoming Group
Conflict 337 (Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller eds., 1999) (exploring the
influence of group and organizational dynamics on success of newcomers); Jason P.
Mitchell et al., Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J. of Exp. Psych. 455
(2003) (exploring the influence of context on attitudes); Don Operario & Susan T.
Fiske, Racism Equals Power Plus Prejudice,in Confronting Racism: The Problem and
the Response 33 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998) (discussing the
influence of power on stereotypic thinking and perceived intergroup differences);
Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29
Contemp. Soc. 319 (2000) (reviewing research on the ways in which organizational
context can activate or suppress social psychological and cognitive processes). This
growing understanding of the cognitive aspects of modern discrimination has
provided a solid empirical foundation for legal scholars who argue that an intentbased antidiscrimination doctrine is increasingly misplaced. See, e.g., Krieger, supra
note 1; Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evoluci6n!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in
Title VII, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 415 (2000); see also Green, supra note 1, at 895-
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evaluate information differently depending on, for example, the ways
in which information is presented, 6 the salience of in-group and outgroup boundaries,7 and the degree of power held in relation to others.8
In addition, at the macro-level, sociologists and organizational
theorists have examined the role of culture, environment, and
institutions in shaping organizational and individual behavior.9 This
work suggests that workplace culture and informal institutions, the
webs of interrelated, taken-for-granted rules and norms that govern
social relationships, serve as important points of inquiry in
understanding individual and group action. 10
99.
6. See, e.g., Virginia Valian, Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women 139-42
(1999) (describing research on the effect of minority group size on perception and
evaluation); Krieger, supra note 1, at 1193-94 (describing research on the
consequences of a minority group member's being a "token" or "solo" in a group).
7. See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Across Cultural Divides: The Value of a
Superordinate Identity, in Cultural Divides: Understanding and Overcoming Group
Conflict 173 (Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller eds., 1999) (describing the effect
of group boundaries on bias and group-based techniques for reducing intergroup
bias); Krieger, supra note 1, at 1191-95 (reviewing research on in-group and out-group
distinctions and the effect of salience).
8. See, e.g., Operario & Fiske, supra note 5, at 49-52.
9. Sociologists and sociological thinkers have long emphasized the importance of
understanding the relationship between the individual act and its social context. See,
e.g., Key Sociological Thinkers (Rob Stones ed., 1998) (describing the work of Talcott
Parsons, emphasizing the role of norms and social values in guiding human conduct,
Erving Goffman, emphasizing structures of interaction, and Harold Garfinkle,
emphasizing background knowledge, among others). More recently, sociological
scholars have begun to cross boundaries between macro- and micro-viewpoints to
consider the ways in which behavior, both individual and organizational, is influenced
by culture, see, e.g., Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 Ann. Rev. Soc. 263, 264
(1997) (reviewing the literature to "lay a foundation for a view of culture as working
through the interaction of shared cognitive structures and supra-individual cultural
phenomena.., that activate those structures to varying degrees"), and by institutions,
see, e.g., Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction, in The New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis 1-38 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991) (describing new institutionalism as a sociological discipline that
embraces cognitive models of thought in which action is influenced by taken-forgranted paths and scripts). For a discussion of some of these and other recent
developments, see generally Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and
the Social Control of Organizations,32 Law & Soc'y Rev. 23, 31-33 (1998). The ideas
from some of this work have also been used to criticize a purely intent-based
antidiscrimination doctrine. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism:
Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 Yale L.J. 1717
(2000).
10. Institutions from this sociological perspective have been defined as "web[s] of
interrelated norms-formal and informal-governing social relationships." Victor
Nee & Paul Ingram, Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social
Structure, in The New Institutionalism in Sociology 19 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee
eds., 1998) (emphasis omitted). Institutions, as they are currently understood, have
both normative and cognitive aspects, combining value-laden beliefs about the way
things should or ought to be with process-driven accounts of how they are or what
they might become. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 9 (describing "old" versus
"new" institutionalism). For an informative essay providing an introduction to new
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One could draw on any number of areas of research and theory in
these disciplines to illustrate that modern workplace discrimination is
a problem of context as well as of individual motivation and cognition.
I draw here at the outset, however, on work in the area of
organizational wrongdoing, specifically the work of Professor Diane
Vaughan concerning the context of decision making at NASA that
shaped the disastrous launching of the 1986 space shuttle Challenger.
Vaughan's extensive ethnographic study of the context underlying the
decision to launch the Challenger pulls together many related microand macro-ideas and provides a particularly vivid illustration of the
importance of looking to organizational structures, cultures, and
institutionalized practices when assessing causation in decision
making. After a brief review of some of the relevant aspects of
Vaughan's work, I consider how her work might inform the modern
antidiscrimination project.
The disaster of January 28, 1986, remains marked in the memories
of many Americans who watched in horror via national television as
the space shuttle Challenger,just 73 seconds after blast-off from Cape
Canaveral, Florida, erupted into a fiery white and yellow explosion."
All seven crew members on board perished, including a schoolteacher
whose assignment it was to teach elementary school children from
space. 12 After an extensive inquiry, a presidentially appointed
investigative commission identified the failure of the space shuttle's
O-rings in the right rocket booster, which provided thrust to the
shuttle at liftoff, as the technical cause of the disaster.13 The O-rings,
designed to seal the gap created by pressure in the rocket booster at
ignition, were impaired by uncharacteristically cold weather in Florida
on the morning of takeoff. 4 The commission also reported that
NASA had contributed to the technical failure. 5 The investigation
revealed that NASA had had difficulties with O-rings since 1977.16
Moreover, the night before the Challenger launch, NASA managers
had engaged in a teleconference discussion with engineers and
managers at Morton Thiokol, Inc., the manufacturer of the
Challenger's rocket boosters. 7 During that teleconference, Morton
institutionalism in organizational analysis and an exploration of the possibilities for an
intellectual exchange between law and society scholarship and new institutionalism in
organizational analysis, see Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational
Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 903 (1996).
11. See Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology,
Culture, and Deviance at NASA 7 (1996).
12. See id.
13. See id. at 10-11. For a detailed description of the role of the 0-rings in the
rocket boosters, see id. at 2-7.
14. See id. at 10.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 5-6.
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Thiokol engineers recommended against launch, citing concern about
the possibility that the predicted cold weather would compromise the
booster 0-rings.18 After a thirty-minute break in the conference,
however, Morton Thiokol managers overrode engineer concerns and
recommended launch, and NASA managers proceeded with the
launch without relaying the specifics of the teleconference to upperlevel NASA administrators. These managers, according to various
accounts, violated industry and internal NASA safety standards in
response to economic, political, and public pressure to launch; in other
words, they "took a calculated risk-and lost."19
Over the course of years of research, a book, and several articles,
Vaughan embarked upon a critical examination of the decision
making at NASA and an in-depth consideration of the implications of
context for social control.2" In her work, she characterizes the
decision to launch the Challenger not, as popular explanation would
portray it, as a calculated managerial decision to ignore existing safety
rules in the face of production deadlines, but as the tragic result of
earlier normalization of deviance through cultural development and
organizational choices. The individuals who decided to launch the
Challenger were not violating NASA rules; they were acting pursuant
to institutionalized cultural belief systems within NASA that shaped
their interpretation of data, assignment of meaning, and action. As
Vaughan explains, "[t]he story begins, not on the eve of the
Challenger launch, when managers and engineers argued about
whether to go forward or not, but nearly 10 years earlier. The pastprevious engineering analysis, conclusions, and launch decisions-was
an all-important context for decisionmaking on the eve of the
launch."21
Vaughan identifies a number of contextual factors that she suggests
made the decision to launch normal and acceptable within NASA. I
highlight just a few of those factors here. First, Vaughan points to the
18. For a detailed description of the teleconference discussion, see id. at 2-7.
19. Id. at 32; see also Vaughn, supra note 9, at 36 (asserting that "[t]he conjunction
of competitive pressures, scarce resources, rule violations, and overriding of the
objections of engineers suggested intent: managerial decisionmaking as violative
behavior-a calculated, amoral, consequentialist, rational choice"). For a discussion
of various popular accounts of the launch decision in terms of amoral calculation, see
generally Vaughn, supra note 11, at 7-32.
20. See Vaughan, supra note 11; Diane Vaughan, Autonomy, Interdependence,
and Social Control: NASA and the Space Shuttle Challenger, 35 Admin. Sci. Q. 225
(1990); Diane Vaughan, Boundary Work: Levels of Analysis, the Macro-Micro Link,
and the Social Control of Organizations,in Social Science, Social Policy, and the Law
291 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999); Vaughan, supra note 9; Diane Vaughan, The
Dark Side of Organizations:Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster,25 Ann. Rev. Soc. 271
(1999). Vaughan relied on data from archival documents from the Presidential
Commission that investigated the disaster as well as on personal interviews,
government investigation reports and hearing transcripts, publications by historians,
scientists, engineers, and journalists. See Vaughan, supra note 9, at 34-35.
21. Vaughan, supra note 9, at 36.
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institutionalized cultural belief systems that shaped the interpretation
of and assignment of meaning to the rocket booster performance data
by the engineers and managers associated with the launch.22 Social
scientific study of engineers and the engineering profession shows that
engineers come to the design table with certain taken-for-granted
understandings about the nature of the job of innovation and design.23
In addition to valuing rule-following and scientific objectivity over
intuition, engineers working on complex tasks like the Challenger
project tend to expect a certain degree of uncertainty and learning-by-

experience and to accept as routine the compromising of optimal
design options to practical cost and safety trade-offs. 24 The engineers
and managers at NASA, in other words, were accustomed to

experimentation

and had confidence

that strict adherence to

engineering methods and routines would result in acceptably safe

diagnosis of problems.25

Within NASA, moreover, organizational changes in the years
leading up to the Challenger launch undermined a traditional culture
of technical excellence. NASA had long cultivated a culture where
top administrators and technicians alike were involved in the technical
aspects of engineering and design of sophisticated machinery.2 6 But,
as NASA became more cost- and production-driven, it began to
contract more work to outside sources and to add layers of
bureaucracy to its internal structure.2 7
Accordingly, NASA's

engineers were increasingly compartmentalized and their decisions
normalized. Evaluations of booster performance, once made by the
engineer work groups,28 were seen as correct and irreversible, despite
uncertainties at each level of analysis.
Over time, the design culture at NASA and corresponding
22. See id. at 39-41. Despite the title distinction, project managers at NASA were
all trained engineers and worked closely with the hands-on work group engineers,
making "the distinction between managers and engineers ...
not as clear as the
dichotomy suggests." Vaughan, supra note 11, at 80.
23. See Vaughan, supra note 9, at 39. Vaughan calls the broader context framing
decision making within NASA a "culture of production." Vaughan, supra note 11, at
198. For a detailed account of this culture, comprised of the institutionalized belief
systems of the aerospace industry, the engineering profession, and the NASA
organization, see id. at 196-237.
24. This compromise of design options is sometimes called "satisficing." See
Vaughan, supra note 9, at 39 (citing earlier social science work).
25. See Vaughan, supra note 11, at 234 (describing "can do" attitude of engineers
and confidence in procedural rigor).
26. Vaughan calls this the "dirty hands approach," explaining: "Contractors were
only used occasionally, and most work was done in house so that top administrators
and technicians alike got their hands 'dirty' by staying in close touch with the
technology." Vaughan, supra note 9, at 40.
27. See id. at 40-41.
28. Vaughan uses the term "work groups" to refer to the engineers and managers
who were responsible for daily technical decision making for a particular shuttle
component. See Vaughan, supra note 11, at 80.
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institutionalized practices of rule-following and design compromise
combined with internal structural changes to normalize decisions
about booster performance. Before each shuttle launch, work groups
were required to2' 9determine that any technical anomalies were an
"acceptable risk.
Each determination of acceptable risk, however,
expanded the amount of technical deviation that was acceptable so
that launching with technical anomalies became commonplace.3 °
Moreover, each determination of acceptable risk tended to transform
uncertainty into certainty, as rules were followed and debates about
0-ring performance in prior post-flight analyses were resolved.
Vaughan provides the following description that accounts for some
of the organizational structures, institutionalized practices, and
cultures at play in the years leading up to the decision to launch the
Challenger:
Post-flight analyses of the [earlier] Space Shuttle missions produced
quantitative evidence.., convincing [the work group] that the
booster design was officially an "Acceptable Risk." Although the
work group understood that the boosters were working, they did not
understand why they were working as they were. Growing doubt,
uncertainty, and anxiety about the unknown notwithstanding,
concern about cost and schedule inhibited.., the work group from
halting missions for the lengthy period necessary for additional tests.
Following the rules, which they unfailingly did, had a socialpsychological effect. Conforming to every rule and proceduregoing by the book-assured them that their official risk assessments
were correct, sustaining the cultural belief that the design was an
"Acceptable Risk." Repeatedly and officially, they recommended
"Go." As the problem unfolded in the years prior
to Challenger,
3
each decision seemed logical, correct, and rational. '
According to this account, rather than taking a calculated risk to
ignore internal safety rules in the face of cost and production
schedules, the managers who overrode engineers' concerns about the
rocket boosters on the eve of the Challengerlaunch, like the engineers
with whom they were trained and worked closely,32 were guided by a
larger organizational context that included institutionalized patterns
and norms of evaluating risk and interpreting information as well as
cost- and production-driven pressures and organizational changes
created by higher policy makers. Within this context, "engineers and
managers together developed a definition of the situation that allowed
them to carry on as if nothing were wrong when they continually faced
evidence that something was wrong."33 In other words, within situated

29. See Vaughan, supra note 9, at 37.

30. See id.
31. Id. at 41 (parentheticals omitted).
32. See Vaughan, supra note 11, at 80.
33. Vaughan, supra note 9, at 36.
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context, the managers who decided to launch the Challenger made a
perfectly rational decision that was, albeit in retrospect tragically
flawed, entirely consistent with NASA safety rules and standards.
Vaughan's work, which places individual and group decision makers
within a larger social and organizational context, is helpful not only
for understanding the decision to launch the ill-fated Challenger, but
also for portraying the complex nature of discrimination in the
modern workplace. Like the engineers at NASA, individuals making
judgments and decisions about others on a day-to-day basis in the
workplace do so within larger organizational context. Culture,
institutionalized practice, and organizational structure and systems
combine to provide a complex backdrop to individual decision
making.
Individuals bring to and obtain from the workplace
institutionalized belief systems that affect their perception and
evaluation. And, like the engineers at NASA, individuals in the
workplace are often consciously unaware of organizational influence
and of the role that bias can play in everyday perceptions, evaluations,
and decisions. Individuals may know that discrimination is not
formally permissible, but, acting within particular organizational and
social context, they may make discriminatory decisions that are
considered acceptable and normal.
Indeed, it may be possible to draw some initial rudimentary
parallels between the ways in which context and normalization of
deviance may have influenced engineering decisions at NASA and the
ways in which these same elements may facilitate ongoing
discrimination in any workplace. When a manager makes a decision
to promote a white worker over a black worker, for example, that
decision is often based in large part on a history of earlier decisions,
both formal and informal, about these and other workers. Some of
these earlier decisions may have been made by the manager making
the promotion decision; others may have been made by co-workers
and lower management. Regardless of the source, these earlier
decisions are likely to attain an aura of certainty, despite uncertainties
and possible operation of discriminatory bias at every level of
evaluation.
Moreover, earlier decisions about these and other
workers are likely to become normalized over time so that, to the
extent discriminatory bias is at play in isolated decisions, merit and
success may begin to be defined along categorical lines. In the end,
the manager's decision to choose the white worker over the black
worker for a promotion may be natural and rational given the
historical context of decision making within the organization, even if
discriminatory bias played a role in the decision.
Vaughan's work is most helpful to the antidiscrimination pursuit,
however, not to suggest that the organizational context influencing
individual decision making in all workplaces is similar to that at play
at NASA, but rather to highlight the need more generally to consider

2003]

TARGETING WORKPLACE CONTEXT

particular organizational context as a causal source of workplace
discrimination. Viewing decision making from Vaughan's broader
causal perspective, one can begin to see how organizational structures,
cultures, and institutionalized practices might facilitate discrimination
depending on the social and organizational context of a particular
workplace. In the financial services industry, for example, access to
accounts and clients may be determined primarily by managers
picking "superstars" from incoming classes of recruits. a4
The
informality of this system of allocating opportunity, favoring intuitive
impressions over detailed consideration of individuated differences,
increases the likelihood that decision makers will rely on stereotypes
in evaluating candidates. a5 At the same time, individuals making
decisions about recruits are likely to do so within a culture historically
and currently dominated by white males, a culture that encourages
individuals to define success in terms of traditionally masculine
characteristics, 6 and to view women as inherently unsuitable for
competitive positions.3 7 Individual managers who choose men over
women as superstars in this scenario may themselves be acting on
discriminatory preferences and bias, whether conscious or
unconscious, but their tendency to do so is influenced by the larger
culture and practice of the organization within which they work.38
34. This example is based on a recent lawsuit filed against American Express. See
infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
35. See Bielby, supra note 5, at 123 (citing research suggesting that informal,
subjective personnel practices increase the risk of reliance on stereotyping); Madeline
E. Heilman, Sex Stereotypes and Their Effects in the Workplace: What We Know and
What We Don't Know, 10 J. of Soc. Behav. & Personality 3, 11-12 (1995) (same);
Barbara F. Reskin & Debra Branch McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations'
Employment of Male and Female Managers,65 Am. Soc. Rev. 210, 214 (2000) (same).
36. Rosabeth Kanter first brought this issue to the forefront in her ethnology of
the large, bureaucratic firm in which she stressed the significance for women of
defining merit according to dominant, male characteristics. See Rosabeth Moss
Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (1977). Other, more detailed, social
scientific research has followed. See, e.g., Judy Wajcman, Managing Like a Man:
Women and Men in Corporate Management 41-51 (1998) (discussing the gendering of
white-collar work); Heilman, supra note 35, at 7-10 (reviewing research on
stereotypically male characteristics considered essential for success in managerial jobs
and consequences for women in the workplace); Reskin & McBrier, supra note 35, at
211-12 (citing studies suggesting that the cognitive schema for managers resembles
that for men more closely than that for women).
37. See Krieger, supra note 1, at 1193-98 (summarizing studies suggesting that
token out-group members are likely to be judged more harshly and according to
stereotypes than their in-group majority counterparts); Kanter, supra note 36, at 211
("[Tiokens are ... both highly visible as people who are different and yet not
permitted the individuality of their own unique, non-stereotypical characteristics.").
38. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & William P. Bridges, Legalizing Gender
Inequality: Courts, Markets, and Unequal Pay for Women in America 244-306 (1999)
(describing organizational bases of "male, profit-making club" at a banking
institution); Reskin & McBrier, supra note 35 (showing link between personnel
practices such as use of informal recruitment networks and subjective selection
processes and sex-based ascription).
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Moreover, sociologists have explained that the racial or gendered
character of taken-for-granted, institutionalized practices is often
rendered invisible to current incumbents of organizational positions.
Current decision makers did not invent the institutionalized practices
that guide their decisions; as far as they can tell, "[t]hey merely are
working within a set of taken-for-granted understandings that do not
explicitly concern [race or] gender."' 9
Social science research provides additional empirical support for
the position that workplace discrimination has causal sources beyond
identifiable bad actors. This research suggests that recruitment
methods, 40 personnel decision-making practices,4 heterogeneity of
work groups,4" accountability structures,4' wage structures," and, of

39. Nelson & Bridges, supra note 38, at 9. A vivid example of the taken-forgranted nature of institutionalized discriminatory decision making is provided by
Professor Ian Haney L6pez in his work on the judicial appointment of grand jurors in
California. See Haney L6pez, supra note 9. Drawing from judicial testimony and
statistics taken from the East Los Angeles Thirteen trial, Haney L6pez documents the
process used by California superior court judges to choose grand jurors and the
discriminatory pattern that developed as a result of that process. Judges, who were
primarily socially elite white males, overwhelmingly nominated their friends, social
and business acquaintances, and neighbors as grand jurors. See id. at 1732-43.
Although there was no formal requirement that judges rely on acquaintances and
friends for appointments, and in fact the Supreme Court and state legislature had
encouraged judges to make efforts to appoint a diverse range of jurors reflective of
the community, see id. at 1792, the judges learned from each other that this nameyour-friends nomination process was "the way it was done," id. at 1791. As Haney
L6pez explains:
[T]he judges subscribed to a nominating system dictated by group dynamics.
Judges learned from one another, sometimes directly, but also at a
nonconscious level. They learned that the appropriate manner of selecting
nominees involved selecting from among their friends. They learned that
those they personally knew described the world of potential nominees.
Id. When asked to explain their reliance on this process, the judges invariably fell
back on their intent to appoint the best "qualified" jurors. See id. at 1803-04. This
intent to appoint the best qualified jurors both served to legitimate their process of
appointment and to reinforce their cultural assumptions about what it takes to be a
qualified juror. See id. at 1804-06.
40. See Reskin & McBrier, supra note 35, at 213-15 (reviewing research suggesting
that reliance on informal networks tends to perpetuate segregation, while formal
recruitment procedures and advertisment tend to facilitate integration).
41. See Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination,
29 Contemp. Soc. 319 (2000).
42. See id.; John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of
Contemporary Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Aversive
Racism, in Confronting Racism: The Problem and the Response, supra note 2, at 2628 (reviewing studies on intergroup perceptions and the effects of recategorization of
groups on bias).
43. See Reskin & McBrier, supra note 35, at 325 (reviewing research on the effect
of accountablity on stereotype reliance and cognitive distortions).
44. See David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-wages, Tournaments, and
Discrimination:A Theory of Employment DiscriminationLaw for "High-Level" Jobs,
33 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 57 (1998) (analyzing the ways in which "efficiency-wage"
and "tournament" models adopted by elite firms can perpetuate discrimination).
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course, the overall environment or culture of the organization,45 may
all contribute in interrelated ways to the operation of discriminatory
bias and unequal treatment in the workplace. As discriminatory bias
becomes embedded in structures and informal practices, it becomes

customary rather than remarkable to see white males dominate in
positions of power.46 Institutionalized practices provide normalizing
scripts for "the way it is done" within the organization and, often

without even noticing, individuals acting pursuant to these practices
perpetuate discrimination and inequity.
B. Implicationsfor Change
A recognition that individual decision making is influenced by

larger organizational context necessarily alters the way one thinks
Implementing meaningful reform that reduces
about change.
incidences of fatal error at NASA will require more than mere
discipline of those individuals who convened on the eve of the
Challenger launch. It will require an understanding of the complex

ways in which institutionalized practices and organizational structures

facilitate disaster through normalization of risk and secrecy; it will

require efforts to counteract the work group tendencies to rely on
rules over intuitive concerns.4 7

Similarly, in the workplace, meaningful antidiscrimination reform
will require a sensitivity to and understanding of the ways in which
individuals are influenced by larger organizational environments and

structures. It will require an inquiry that is broad enough to recognize
larger patterns of discrimination and to identify the possible
organizational sources of that discrimination. It is no longer either
45. The culture or environment of the workplace can enable discriminatory
decision making in a variety of ways, both within and without the dominant group.
See Brewer et al., supra note 5 (summarizing research results that suggest that
newcomer socialization into large organizations is facilitated by shared social category
membership and poses greater demands on minority newcomers); Devon W. Carbado
& Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1259 (2000) (describing extra
constraints that outsiders face in signaling involvement and competence); Barbara
Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19 Ann. Rev. Soc. 241, 261 (1993)
(reviewing research concerning more extreme attempts to drive out interlopers).
46. Equating certain jobs with stereotypically racial or gendered characteristics
may lead to organizational practices that institutionalize the customary conception in
job requirements or career ladders. See Reskin & McBrier, supra note 35, at 211-12.
47. See Vaughan, supra note 9, at 34-35 (discussing implications of organizational
causation for social control). Indeed, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Report suggests that many of the same contextual influences may have played a role
in the more recent space shuttle Columbia disaster. See The CAIB Report (Aug. 26,
2003), available at http://www.caib.us (tracing possible organizational sources of the
disaster). Other recent reports remind us, however, that context should not be
emphasized to the exclusion of human agency. See, e.g., James Glanz & John
Schwartz, Dogged Engineer's Effort to Assess Shuttle Damage, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26,
2003, at Al (reporting active resistance by NASA managers to engineer requests for
outside imagery of Columbia damage).
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possible or sensible to search exclusively for an identifiable bad actor
at a discrete moment in time. Instead, the causal inquiry must include
questions about decision-making practices, culture, and internal
organization and structures that may continue to facilitate
discrimination beyond a single, identifiable instance.
At the same time, the complex, contextual nature of the problem of
workplace discrimination calls for a correspondingly innovative,
contextualized solution. There is no single answer that can be applied
to all organizations that will reduce discrimination in the workplace.
Rather, the contours of the solution to a problem of institutionalized
or organizationally enabled discrimination will depend on the specifics
of the particular organizational context as well as on an understanding
of the relevant social science and organizational research and
literature on the ways in which context interacts with individuals and
groups to produce discrimination.4"
This means that devising
strategies for and implementation of meaningful organizational
change will require intensive self-assessment and a commitment to
reform, in many cases a commitment that must be sustained over a
long period of time.49
Yet employers are unlikely to undertake this task without some
outside incentive to do so. Even assuming that companies respond
rationally to market pressures in implementing antidiscrimination
reform and that these companies would prefer to eliminate irrational
and inefficient forms of discrimination that prevent capable workers
from reaching their full potential, there are several reasons why
market pressures are unlikely to trigger the type of change necessary
to resolve organizational sources of discrimination.
First, the
immediate costs involved in evaluating organizational structures and
practices and implementing change may make current executives
reluctant to take on the task.5" These immediate costs could take a
variety of forms, from relatively straightforward monetary and time
48. Case studies of some of the seemingly successful efforts to implement
organizational change aimed at reducing workplace inequity reflect a variety of
approaches. See, e.g., Susan E. Jackson et al., Diversity in the Workplace: Human
Resource Initiatives (1992) (presenting three case studies of employers who took
structural measures to increase workplace equity); David A. Thomas & John J.
Gabarro, Breaking Through: The Making of Minority Executives in Corporate
America (1999) (providing case studies of three organizations and their diversity
management strategies); Debra E. Meyerson & Joyce K. Fletcher, A Modest
Manifesto for Shattering the Glass Ceiling, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 126
(illustrating how three companies used incremental change and problem-solving
techniques in organizational structure and practices to bring about systemic change).
49. The organizational literature has long emphasized the need for efforts at
change to coincide with the core values of an organization. See, e.g., Thomas &
Gabarro, supra note 48, at 198-209.
50. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America's
Newest Export (2001) (arguing that the American corporate structure encourages
managers to aim for short-term maximization of stock prices).
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investment to more subtle reductions in productivity due to backlash
and resentment from dominant groups. Research suggests a longterm economic benefit to companies willing to manage diversity in
ways that reduce inequity and discriminatory bias in decision
making,5 but short-term costs may seem more significant to current
executives than any long-term benefits.
Second, thinking about market pressure more broadly, one might
expect some employers to respond to negative consumer reaction to
ongoing workplace discrimination. Evidence suggests that most
Americans subscribe to an egalitarian ideal that might translate into
public pressure for large organizations to reform their discriminatory
practices.5" Again, however, it seems unlikely that employers will face
substantial public pressure in the current market without some outside
trigger. Consumers tend to know very little about companies'
employment practices, and the subtle nature of modern workplace
discrimination means that these structural forms of discrimination
may be less likely to appear problematic to outside observers than the
more overt forms of discrimination of the past. Litigation, and
particularly the class action device, brings with it increased publicity
and public pressure for organizational reform that might not exist
otherwise.53
There is also reason to believe that the entrenched, taken-forgranted nature of institutionally enabled discrimination renders it
particularly resistant to market-induced reform. Research suggests
that employers may continue to discriminate even when they attempt
51. See, e.g., Jackson et al., supra note 48, at 13-28 (suggesting that meeting
"challenges" of diversity will lead to greater workforce productivity); Carsten K.W.
De Dreu, Productive Conflict: The Importance of Conflict Management and Conflict
Issue, in Using Conflict in Organizations 10 (Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Evert Van de
Vliert eds., 1997) (discussing some benefits of managing diversity and conflict on
worker performance).
52. See, e.g., James M. Jones, Prejudice and Racism 93-100 (detailing studies
showing an overall trend toward endorsement of the principle of racial equality in the
1970s); John F. Dovido & Samuel L. Gaertner, Prejudice,Discrimination,and Racism:
Historical Trends and Contemporary Approaches, in Prejudice, Discrimination, and
Racism, supra note 2, at 3 (summarizing findings of studies based on responses to
public opinion polls and surveys from the 1940s to the late 1970s); Reskin, supra note
45, at 248-49 (citing studies reflecting a change in attitude concerning sex equality).
For a closer look at the complexity of modern racial attitudes, see Katherine Tate &
Gloria J. Hampton, Changing Hearts and Minds: Racial Attitudes and Civil Rights, in
Legacies of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000), and for studies
seeking to measure implicit race and gender attitudes, see Mahzarin R. Banaji &
Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice, in The Psychology of
Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium 55 (Mark P. Zanna & James M. Olson eds., 1994).
53. A number of the recent class actions were widely publicized, making the pages
of national news media. See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Microsoft Faces Largest Racial Bias
Lawsuit Ever, USA Today, Jan. 4, 2001, at B9; Tim Lempke, Home Depot Faces
Class-Action Suit, Wash. Times, July 10, 2001, at B7; Melody Peterson, Two
Employees File Bias Suit Against Johnson and Johnson, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2001, at
C6.
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to respond to the market. Robert L. Nelson and William P. Bridges,
in their work analyzing wage disparities at several public and private

organizations, illustrate that employers may maintain or create wage
inequity in ways that neither follow the market nor maximize
efficiency.

4

Despite an ideological commitment to paying market

rates and merit-based compensation, these firms structured paths of
advancement and definitions of merit so that women and minorities
were intrinsically

disadvantaged.5

Recruitment

and personnel

advancement systems, male-dominated construction of wage surveys
and job evaluations, and general resistance to change in
institutionalized practices and organizational cultures all contributed
in various ways to wage disparities at the firms that could not be
explained by market forces or efficiency considerations.56
Finally, assuming that we could quantify the exact costs and benefits
of remedying organizational causes of discrimination in economic
terms, it may be that the economic costs of identifying and remedying
organizational sources of discrimination will outweigh any long-term
market benefits. If this is so, companies will make a rational choice to

maintain the status quo even in the face of market pressure. That
antidiscrimination efforts may involve costs, however, does not mean
that changes should not be made. Scholars have identified a number

of ways in which discrimination may represent a rational or efficient

choice for employers.57 Statistical discrimination is one example of a
practice that arguably benefits the discriminating employer.58 And

yet, the law has long recognized that complying with the prohibition
not to discriminate may entail costs borne by employers; indeed it
holds them liable for statistical discrimination, even if the inability to

engage in this type of discrimination imposes additional transaction
54. See Nelson & Bridges, supra note 38, at 11 (summarizing findings); id. at 51
(concluding that "a significant portion of the wage gap between male and female jobs
arises inside or is perpetuated by employing organizations and is not dictated by
market or efficiency principles"). For a detailed explanation of the conceptual and
methodological foundations for the empirical project undertaken by Nelson and
Bridges, see id. at 1-22.
55. See id. at 300 (describing study of Glass v. CoastalBank).
56. See id. at 321-23.
57. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against
Employment Discrimination Laws 59-76 (1992) (suggesting that discrimination can
facilitate the selection and management of a more productive workforce and/or satisfy
customer, worker, or owner preferences); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and
Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 1003, 1033-63 (1995) (providing a status-production explanation of
discrimination and suggesting that the value obtained from status production accounts
for the persistence of discrimination even in the face of market competition); David
A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discriminationin Employment: The
Case for Numerical Standards, 79 Geo. L.J. 1619, 1639-43 (1991) (explaining
persistence of statistical discrimination in the face of market pressure).
58. Statistical discrimination is typically described as the use of minority group
membership "as a proxy for characteristics that are legitimate employment
qualifications." Strauss, supra note 57, at 1621.
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costs.5 9 Efficiency, in other words, is not the only or even the primary
justification for antidiscrimination laws; equality in employment is.6'
Discrimination in the modern workplace remains a human problem,
but a human problem with organizational dimensions. Vaughan's
work on the context of decision making underlying the NASA
decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger, by illustrating the
complexity of individual and group decision making within
organizations, sheds light on the problem of modern workplace
discrimination and reveals the breadth of inquiry needed to trigger
meaningful reform. It illustrates that a legal inquiry that focuses
exclusively on identification of discrete bad actors discriminating in
isolation and in calculated contravention to well-established
egalitarian ideals fails to account for the complex ways in which
decisions are influenced by larger organizational and social context.
As she explains, such an approach "decontextualizes decisions to
violate, neglecting the social context that leads people to make the
choices that they do."61 Progress in the project toward equity and
nondiscrimination in the workplace, then, just like progress in the
project to reduce the incidence of fatal disasters at NASA, requires an
impetus for employer institutional reform that will alter the
organizational dynamics of everyday decision making.
II. TITLE VII AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: PAST AND PRESENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act holds the potential to expand the
dimensions of organizational concern, opening up dialogue and
awareness in ways that encourage employers to look for patterns of
discrimination and to seek meaningful institutional change.62 In fact, a
59. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978) (holding that Title VII prohibits generalization by protected characteristic,
even if true generalization).
60. Of course, the definition of equality is highly debated. Although this Article
does not depend on a particular construction of the term, equality may mean much
more than formal equality or characteristic blindness. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, AntiSubordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003
(1986); Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1389
(1991); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformationand Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331
(1988).
61. Vaughan, supra note 9, at 49.
62. Title VII provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
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number of recent private class action lawsuits have arguably begun to
reshape the antidiscrimination inquiry to include modern
organizational sources of harm. In this part, I examine the features of
this new form of enforcement litigation. I begin by placing recent
efforts at institutional reform in some historical context by providing a
brief account of the individualization and privatization of Title VII
enforcement efforts since the statute's inception in 1964. I then lay
out some of the basic characteristics of the recent Title VII class
action lawsuits seeking institutional reform. I suggest that these
lawsuits both share similarities with and exhibit differences from early
attempts at institutional reform through Title VII, and in Parts III and
IV of the Article I explore how these similarities and differences may
affect the lawsuits' collective capacity to trigger meaningful
institutional change.
A. Early Reform and Individualizationof Enforcement
Although institutional reform has always been an important goal of
Title VII, the scope of the enforcement inquiry has narrowed over
time. A brief look at the history of Title VII enforcement, both public
and private, reveals a shift in focus toward the isolated individual
discriminator and away from larger institutional or organizational
sources of discrimination.
From the outset, Title VII provided for a combination of public and
private enforcement. Until Title VII was amended in 1972, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the regulatory
agency created by the statute, had no enforcement powers.63 Instead,
it was charged with an investigative and conciliative role, limited to
negotiation, adoption of record-keeping and reporting regulations,
The U.S. Attorney
and formulation of interpretive guidelines.'
General, however, had authority from the start to bring suit to
challenge "pattern[s] or practice[s]" of discrimination,65 and private
individuals had the power to file suit challenging individual instances
as well as broader practices of discrimination.66
or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
63. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Modern Law: The Law Transmission System and
Equal Employment Opportunity 47-49 (1993) (explaining that the decision to limit
enforcement authority of the EEOC was used to break a filibuster on the bill).
64. See id.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964). A "pattern or practice" is typically
considered "something more than an isolated, sporadic incident." 110 Cong. Rec.
14,270 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey), quoted in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977).
66. Title VII includes a provision allowing attorneys fees to be paid to the
"prevailing party." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The Supreme Court has interpreted this
provision to require that a prevailing plaintiff be awarded attorneys fees in all but
special circumstances, but that a prevailing defendant be awarded fees only in cases in
which the action brought is found to be unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or
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The early years of Title VII enforcement saw a number of attempts
to change organizational structures and practices through litigation or
threat of litigation. On the public side, the Department of Justice
brought a series of enforcement suits that challenged the67
discriminatory practices of large corporations, even entire industries.
These suits often sought to re-work the seniority systems in place at
companies that had traditionally segregated job categories. In the
early 1970s, for example, the Department of Justice sued Bethlehem
Steel 6 and United States Steel,6 9 challenging that their seniority and
transfer systems perpetuated past discrimination. After success in
those suits, the Department of Justice brought suit against nine
additional major steel companies, representing almost 75% of the
steel industry, in a single action. 7 That suit resulted in a reorganized
system of transfer and seniority across the industry. In 1974, the

government also sued seven major trucking companies for failing to
hire minorities for higher paying jobs and for maintaining
discriminatory seniority and transfer systems.71
Again, the
government sought major institutional reform, and ultimately
succeeded.72
The EEOC similarly exercised its investigatory powers in the early
days of Title VII to conduct broad investigations into company-wide
discriminatory practices. 73 The EEOC regularly used the individual
charges filed with the agency as springboards for investigations into
larger company practices.74 As Alfred Blumrosen, the first Chief of
vexatious. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
67. Despite the breadth of enforcement inquiry in these early suits, the
Department of Justice was criticized for not bringing enough suits, see, e.g., Procedure
Under Title VII, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1230-31 (1971), a criticism that sparked the
1972 amendment providing the EEOC with power to file suit. A total of 57 pattern or
practice suits were brought from the effective date of Title VII, July 2, 1965, through
January 8, 1971. See id. at 1230 n.206.
68. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
69. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 5 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8619
(N.D. Ala. 1973).
70. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 834 n.1 (5th Cir.
1975) (approving proposed consent decree). The EEOC was also a plaintiff in this
action. See id. at 834. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund and National Organization
for Women opposed the settlement on the ground that the monetary relief provided
was inadequate. See id.
71. See In re Trucking Indus. Employment Practices Litig., 384 F. Supp. 614
(J.P.M.L. 1974). The suit originally named a defendant class of 349 trucking
companies across the nation, with seven defendant trucking companies as named
representatives. See id. at 614-15.
72. The case was ultimately resolved pursuant to a consent decree. See AlleghenyLudlum Indus., 517 F.2d at 826 (approving proposed consent decree).
73. Blumrosen, supra note 63, at 61-62. During this time, the EEOC also issued
guidelines interpreting the substantive law broadly, including practices that have a
discriminatory effect within the statute's prohibition. See id. at 71-76.
74. See id. at 79-80. In the course of investigating an individual charge, it is well
understood that the EEOC may seek to vindicate a public interest as well as to obtain
relief for an individual claimant. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296
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Conciliations for the Commission, explains it, the EEOC would
examine the company's practices "to see if there was a pattern of
restriction of blacks from the type of job the complainant sought ....
The individual victim remained important, but the victim's situation
became the lens which focused on the harm to other group members
with similar employment characteristics." 75 Recognizing the need for
systemic change, the EEOC directed its conciliation efforts during this
period at institutional reform. The agency was instrumental, for
example, in a 1966 conciliation decree involving the Newport News
Shipyard, the largest employer in Virginia at the time.76 The
conciliation decree focused on reform of basic employment practices
at the shipyard in an effort to eliminate system-wide discrimination
against minorities.7 7 The decree required, among other things, the
retention of an expert, approved by the EEOC, to prepare job
descriptions and to identify proper pay and promotion rates.7 8
The private lens of enforcement was equally broad in the early
years of Title VII. Private litigants, suing on behalf of themselves and
others, regularly used the federal class action device to challenge
wide-spread systems and policies of discrimination. Individuals
theoretically can seek institutional reform without use of the class
action device, but courts are often unwilling to implement
organizational solutions for individual discriminatory decisions.79 The
use of the class action device, therefore, becomes important for
privately triggered institutional change; by broadening the number of
complainants, the class action triggers inquiry about institutional and
organizational sources of harm and encourages development of
solutions aimed at systemic reform. The 1966 amendments to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions in federal
courts, facilitated the certification of civil rights suits for class
treatment.80 Moreover, in the first decade of Title VII enforcement
(2002). The EEOC may also instigate an investigation by charge filed by a
Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000).
75. Blumrosen, supra note 63, at 80, 82-83. This focus on broader institutional
change as one aspect of the remedy to discrimination paralleled an ideological
movement toward recognition of group as well as individual interests. See id. at 79-85.
76. See id. at 86-88.
77. See id. at 87 (reproducing EEOC summary of Newport News Shipyard
Agreement).
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 766-67 (4th Cir.
1998) (limiting prevailing non-class plaintiffs to individualized injunctive relief),
vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999). See generally George Rutherglen,
Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 688, 688 (1980) (describing benefits of
class actions to plaintiffs, including achievement of "broader goals of institutional
reform").
80. Prior to the 1966 amendments, civil rights cases were classified as "spurious,"
which meant that if a class action was unsuccessful, an unnamed plaintiff was
permitted to bring an identical suit against the same institution. See Robert Belton, A
Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights
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courts readily certified "across-the-board"
class actions in
employment discrimination cases, without much attention to the
requirements of Rule 23.81 By the mid-1970s, more than one thousand
private employment discrimination class actions were being filed in
federal courts each year.82 Many of the plaintiffs in these early suits
were represented by public interest groups like the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, and, like their government-initiated counterparts, the
cases often alleged discrimination on a company-wide scale and
sought significant institutional reform, including elimination of entry
requirements and reorganization of seniority systems in addition to
back pay for individual victims and affirmative action plans to remedy
past discrimination.83
On a number of fronts, however, by the early 1980s, the scope of
Title VII enforcement had begun to narrow. The EEOC continues to
play an important role in challenging patterns or practices of
discrimination through litigation and conciliation. " Yet, hampered by
a backlog of administrative charges, the agency has significantly
narrowed its investigative inquiry to focus on individual incidents of
discrimination rather than on larger organizational sources of harm,
and has tended to expend its litigative resources on individual rather
than systemic challenges.8 Since the 1970s, the EEOC has struggled
Act of 1964, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 905, 932-33 (1978).
81. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
82. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 1020, Fig. 9 (1991).
According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts' statistics, 1,174 "Civil
Rights-Jobs" class actions were commenced in federal courts in 1976 and 1,138 were
filed in 1977. See 1977 Ann. Rep. of the Dir. of the Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts. 239
(Table 32: Civil Class Actions Commenced in the U.S. District Courts by Basis of
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit Statistical Year 1977).
83. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund was the organization most involved in the
early litigation, but others, such as the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee,
Employment Rights Project of Columbia Law School, and the Lawyer's Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, also contributed to early enforcement through litigation.
See Belton, supra note 80, at 924 n.101. Early NAACP Legal Defense Fund litigation
sought institutional reform in the tobacco industry, the textile and paper industries,
and the steel industry, see id. at 930 n.125, and was instrumental in the early
development of class action litigation, see id. at 924-34.
84. Section 706 of Title VII authorizes the EEOC to bring a civil action against a
private employer reasonably believed to be engaged in unlawful employment
practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(f) (2000). Although, prior to 1991, the EEOC
could only seek equitable relief through a § 706 enforcement action, it is now
empowered to seek compensatory and punitive damages in addition to equitable
relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(d) (2000). The number of systemic cases litigated by
the EEOC reached a low in 1996 of 32 cases, but it increased to 84 in 1997, 83 in 1998,
110 in 1999, and 105 in 2000. See Nancy Kreiter, Equal Employment Opportunity:
EEOC and OFCCP,in Rights at Risk: Equality in an Age of Terrorism, 153, 155
(2002) (EEOC litigation statistics combine direct suits and interventions), available at
http://www.cccr.org/chapter12.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).
85. An increasing backlog of charges has long plagued the EEOC. During its first
fiscal year, the EEOC received 8,854 charges, well over the 2,000 estimated. See
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to implement various procedural reforms aimed at quickly resolving
individual claims of discrimination.86 In addition, by the late 1970s,
the Commission had adopted an internal directive precluding its
investigators from examining the broader implications of a charge
unless the charge was designated for systemic investigation or early
litigation, thus narrowing the investigative inquiry for most charges.8"
Private enforcement under Title VII during this same period also
began to experience a shift from lawsuits aimed at institutional reform
to lawsuits aimed at resolution of individual instances of
discrimination. The use of the class action device by private litigants
dropped significantly in the late 1970s, and the decline continued
steadily into the early 1990s.8" At the same time, individual lawsuits
challenging isolated employment decisions rose dramatically.8 9
Although this procedural trend may be attributable in part to
decisions of the Supreme Court in the late 1970s and early 1980s that
Belton, supra note 80, at 921. By 1974, the EEOC faced a backlog of 98,000 charges.
See Blumrosen, supra note 63, at 396 n.2. Of course, the focus of EEOC enforcement
efforts can vary from one presidential administration to the next, but the backlog of
individual charges hampers efforts to emphasize systemic change. See Maurice E.R.
Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 219
(1995).
86. See Blumrosen, supra note 63, at 161-65.
87. See General Accounting Office, Further Improvements Needed, in EEOC
Enforcement Activities 8-10 (April 9, 1981) (describing implementation of the "rapid
charge process" and the creation of systemic discrimination units); see generally David
L. Rose, Twenty-five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment
Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1121, 1147-53 (1989) (describing
enforcement activity of the EEOC). EEOC enforcement was further restricted by a
narrowing definition of "reasonable cause." Settlements can be negotiated by the
EEOC at any time during investigation of the complaint, but the agency will not begin
formal conciliation efforts until after it has determined that there is "reasonable cause
to believe that the charge is true." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The regulations provide
for efforts at conciliation "[w]here the Commission determines that there is
reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred or is
occurring." EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1991) (emphasis
added). From 1965 to 1977, the EEOC defined reasonable cause to include "'any
evidence' which might lead to a conclusion that discrimination had taken place."
Blumrosen, supra note 63, at 62. By 1977 reasonable cause was defined as "litigation
worthy" and by 1981 it meant "likely to prevail in court." Id. at 270. In 1994, the
standard was again changed to mean "whether it is more likely than not that the
statute was violated." Alfred W. Blumrosen, The EEOC at the End of the First
Clinton Administration, in The Continuing Struggle: Civil Rights and the Clinton
Administration 75 (1997), available at http://www.cccr.org/reports.htm (last visited
Oct. 17, 2003).
88. Class action lawsuits filed in federal courts went from 1,174 in 1976 to 323 in
1980, to 156 in 1983, and to only 30 in 1991. See Ann. Rep. of the Dir. of the Admin.
Off. of the U.S. Cts., Table X-5, U.S. District Courts Class Action Civil Cases
Commenced, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library.html.
Even taking into
account the questionable accuracy of specific numbers on class actions reported in the
Administrative Office Report, see Thomas E. Willging et al., Empirical Study of Class
Actions in Four Federal District Courts (1996), a general trend can be discerned.
89. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 82, at 1019-21 (documenting a rise in
individual claims and a decline in class action claims).
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tightened the requirements for class certification in employment
discrimination suits, doing away with "across-the-board" class
actions, 90 it emerges as part of a larger trend toward the
individualization of the substantive law, a trend that has focused
efforts on identification of discrimination by isolated individuals
without attention to larger organizational influences.9"
The enforcement inquiry has been further narrowed by the
increasing use of internal dispute resolution systems and arbitration to
resolve workplace discrimination complaints.
Internal dispute
resolution ("IDR") systems and outside arbitration can pose a barrier
to detecting discrimination in the workplace by individualizing and
personalizing conflict in ways that inhibit recognition of broader
patterns or institutional sources of discrimination. Social science
research in a number of contexts suggests that informal processes of
out-of-court dispute resolution, including IDR systems that resolve
disputes within the organizations themselves, tend to redefine social
problems as personal problems by deemphasizing legal rights and
emphasizing party interests and needs.92 Research on IDR in the
employment discrimination area in particular suggests that IDR
complaint handlers tend to recast legal issues as interpersonal issues,
identifying management problems or personality clashes rather than
discrimination as the source of workplace difficulties.93 Although this
recasting of conflict in personal and individual terms may not affect a
particular complainant's satisfaction with resolution of the dispute,94 it
does have significant consequences for identification of and attention
to larger organizational sources of discrimination. Internal dispute
resolution systems, by individualizing the conflict, also tend to provide
individualized solutions aimed at smoothing over relations between
certain employees or changing the behavior of isolated employees
through punishment or education rather than at changing larger
organizational structures and institutional practices that may have
resulted in the discriminatory behavior in the first place.9
In these ways, Title VII enforcement efforts, both public and
90. See infra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
91. See Green, supra note 1, at 91 (describing individualized conception of
discrimination that underlies much of existing Title VII doctrine).
92. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The
Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 Law & Soc'y Rev. 497, 503-05
(1993). For a general discussion about the transformation from rights to interests and
needs in alternative dispute resolution, see Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute
Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to the
Reconstruction of the JuridicalSubject, 66 Denv. U. L. Rev. 437, 472-96 (1989).
93. See Edelman et al., supra note 92, at 515-16.
94. For a discussion of some of the benefits of private procedures, see Elizabeth
Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacementof Conflict, 6 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 1,
45-47 (1997).
95. See Edelman et al., supra note 92, at 522-28 (describing remedies provided in
internal dispute resolution systems).
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private, have, over time, shifted to focus on remedying individual
instances of discrimination rather than on remedying larger problems
of discrimination through institutional reform. Correspondingly, this
tendency to search for the isolated discriminator at a discrete moment
in time inhibits an inquiry into organizational causes of discrimination,
burying organizational influence behind the motivations of individual
actors.
Individuals are identified as the source of workplace
discrimination while larger organizational influences are left
unchecked.
B. Recent Shift: New Class Actions
In the last decade, courts have seen renewed efforts at privately
instituted organizational reform through the use of class action
lawsuits.96 The plaintiffs in many of these lawsuits have alleged
widespread discrimination in workplaces with highly decentralized
decision-making systems and largely subjective decision-making
practices that leave white males, who predominate in positions of
power, to exercise their discretion in biased ways.97 Institutional
96. While only 30 private employment discrimination class action lawsuits were
filed in federal courts in 1992, 67 were filed in 1997, 77 were filed in 2000, and 70 were
filed in 2001. See Ann. Rep. of the Dir. of the Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Table X-5,
U.S. District Courts Class Action Civil Cases Commenced, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/library.html.
The increase in privately instituted
employment discrimination suits is attributable in part to an increase in the amount of
monetary recovery permitted under Title VII, for in 1991, Title VII was amended to
add compensatory and punitive damages to existing equitable remedies of back and
front pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). Although other commentators have
noticed this shift, see, e.g., Gary M. Kramer, No Class: Post-1991 Barriers to Rule 23
Certification of Across-the-Board Employment Discrimination Cases, 15 Lab. Law.
415 (2000); Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination:The Nature of Class Action
Employment DiscriminationLitigation and Its Effects, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1249 (2003),
none has presented a comprehensive look at the features of recent lawsuits as
compared to earlier attempts at Title VII-triggered institutional reform. For an
examination of the effect of large monetary settlements in some recent class actions
on the stock prices of publicly held companies and an argument that the recent
lawsuits have produced little substantive change within the targeted corporations, see
Selmi, supra.
97. See, e.g., Clayborne v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 211 F.R.D. 573, 592 (D. Neb.
2002) (alleging that a "policy of permitting subjective decision making by individual
managers ... resulted in racial discrimination"); McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott
Servs., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 428, 433 (D.D.C. 2002) (alleging widespread discrimination by
predominately white high-level managers exercising "virtually total discretion in their
promotion decisions"); Reap v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 199 F.R.D. 536, 544 (D.N.J. 2001)
(alleging that policy of "delegating discretionary authority to subordinate managers
and supervisors to make employment decisions.., without sufficient oversight"
resulted in discrimination); Abram v. UPS, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 424, 425 (E.D. Wis. 2001)
(challenging highly subjective performance rating and compensation systems); Wright
v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 526, 532 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (alleging that
decentralized decision making and subjectivity, among other practices, results in
discrimination); Lott v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 200 F.R.D. 539, 543
(D.S.C. 2000) (alleging discrimination in evaluation for promotion conducted by
"predominately white decision makers who rely on subjective, race-based factors");
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reform as well as money damage awards, including compensatory and
punitive damages, have been sought as remedies.9 8
A closer
examination of some of these lawsuits reveals that they share a
marked resemblance to their early Title VII counterparts, providing a
useful lens for broadening the enforcement inquiry to include
organizational sources of discrimination, but that they also differ in
important ways, raising concerns about the ability of this recent
litigation to trigger meaningful institutional reform.
I begin this section by presenting a brief account of several of the
recent cases as examples of this new form of Title VII litigation. I
then use these cases as a starting point for an outline of the basic
characteristics of this recent litigation before turning in Parts III and
IV to examine the potential of these lawsuits to effect meaningful
institutional change that reduces the incidence of discrimination in the
modern workplace.
1. Examples
Many of the Title VII class action lawsuits filed in federal courts
over the past several years have alleged widespread discrimination at
major corporations through largely decentralized, highly subjective
decision-making systems, lacking in specific or objective criteria or
oversight.99 The plaintiffs in these cases often allege that white males,
who predominate in positions of power, are left to exercise their
discretion in biased ways, leading to disparities in hiring, work
assignments, training, discipline, promotion, and/or pay. 100 Courts
have been inconsistent in their willingness to certify the claims for
class treatment.'
A few examples from those courts that have
certified these cases for class treatment, however, whether for
McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 267, 273 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (alleging
discrimination through subjective discretion); Zachery v. Texaco Exploration &
Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 235 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (attacking defendant's job
evaluation and promotion system as being too subjective and leading to denial of
training and promotion on the basis of race); Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., No. 951162-CIV-T-25(E), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381, at *18-*19 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996)
(challenging defendant's policy of "delegating hiring and promotion decisions to
managers, who make.., decisions on the basis of subjective criteria"). Some similar
lawsuits predate the recent numerical trend. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Safeway Stores, No.
CIV S-92-0803, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22572, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1992)
(alleging discrimination through use of "unweighted subjective and arbitrary criteria
in making assignment, training and promotional decisions" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 319 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(alleging that subjective hiring and promotion criteria lead to discrimination).
98. See, e.g., McReynolds, 208 F.R.D. at 448; Reap, 199 F.R.D. at 541; Smith v.
Texaco, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 663, 679 (E.D. Tex. 2000). But see Zachary, 185 F.R.D. at
235 (seeking injunctive relief and back pay but not compensatory damages or punitive
damages).
99. See supra note 97.
100. See supra note 97.
101. See infra Part III.
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adjudication or upon approval of a consent decree, should help
illustrate the basic characteristics of this new form of institutional
reform litigation.
i. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc.
In Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., seven female employees and
applicants of Home Depot's West Coast Division, covering ten states,
filed a class action lawsuit in the district court for the Northern
District of California. 2 The plaintiffs were represented by three
private law firms. 3 The plaintiffs alleged that Home Depot, a
national do-it-yourself home improvement retailer, had discriminated
against women in hiring, job assignment, training, promotions, and
compensation by maintaining an entirely subjective decision-making
system that left broad discretion to male management with hostile and
stereotypical attitudes toward women."' The district court certified a
class that included female applicants and employees in the Home
Depot West Coast Division.'0 5
On the eve of trial, the parties settled, and in January 1998, the
court approved a proposed consent decree. 0 6 The consent decree
provided for a $65 million settlement fund and an additional $22.5
million in attorneys fees. 0 7 The decree also provided for injunctive
relief, including implementation of a job preferences process that
enables employees and applicants to enter job preferences and
qualifications into a computerized database. 0 8 Based on information
entered into the computer, qualified applicants then are automatically
placed into a pool of applicants for interviews.'0 9 Managers must
interview at least three applicants for each position, following a set of
structured interview questions for the interview process. The consent
decree also required that internal positions be created for monitoring
aggregate data acquired by the new computer system, and, for the
duration of the decree, the company was required to report regularly

102. See Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3370
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1996).
103. See id.
104. See id. at *4.
105. See id.; see also Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16296 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997) (denying motion for decertification of
applicant and employee classes).
106. See Nadya Aswad, Court Approves $65 Million Settlement of Sex Bias Suit
Against Home Depot, 11 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D19 (Jan. 16, 1998), available at
LEXIS, News Library, DLR File.
107. See id.
108. See id. For a detailed account of some of the structural reforms implemented
at Home Depot, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A
StructuralApproach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 509-19 (2001).
109. See Sturm, supra note 108, at 513-14.
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to class counsel."' 0

On June 24, 2002, the court lifted the consent

decree, more than a year in advance of its expiration.11 '
ii. Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co.
In Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., four African-American salaried
employees filed a class action lawsuit against Coca-Cola alleging
widespread discrimination on the basis of race in evaluation,
compensation, promotion, and discharge. 1 2
The plaintiffs were
represented by two private law firms.113 The plaintiffs alleged in part
that Coca-Cola's performance evaluation system and word-of-mouth

promotion recommendation system provided for undue discretion
that led to biased decisions by white managers.1

4

During early stages

of the litigation, the parties engaged in court-ordered mediation and

agreed to settle.1 5 The resulting consent decree provided for a
settlement fund of $113 million with an additional $20.7 million to be
paid to class counsel. 6 The decree included injunctive relief that
required diversity training, the hiring of an industrial psychologist to

undertake a review of the company's human resources practices, and
the establishment of an outside task force to evaluate and monitor the
effectiveness of the decree. 17
iii. Kosen v. American Express Financial Advisors, Inc.
In Kosen v. American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., after two
years of negotiation and mediation, fifteen women who worked as
financial advisors at various American Express financial offices across
the country filed a class action lawsuit against their employer and, one
day later, filed a proposed consent decree.118 The plaintiffs were
110. See id. at 517.
111. See Joyce E. Cutler, Court Terminates Home Depot Sex Discrimination
Consent Decree, 125 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A5 (June 28, 2002), available at
LEXIS, News Library, DLR File. The court cited evidence of effective
implementation as evidence supporting its decision to lift the decree. See id.
112. See Amended Complaint, Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 1$ 28-30 (Jan. 12, 2000)
(No. 1-98-CV-3679).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' class allegations before discovery,
see infra Part III.B. (discussing holding by some courts that class certification of a
Title VII class action is improper if plaintiffs seek money damages as well as equitable
relief); the motion was denied. See Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 1-98-CV-3679,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211 (N.D. Ga. July 16, 1999).
116. See Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1371-74 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
117. See id. at 1368-71.
118. See Order Approving Consent Decree, Kosen v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors,
Inc., at 1 (No. 1: 02CV0082) (D.D.C. June 16, 2002) [hereinafter Order Approving
Consent Decree]. The plaintiffs had worked in offices in New Jersey, Minnesota, New
York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Florida. See Complaint, Kosen v.
Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., at 3-5 (No. 1: 02-CV0082) [hereinafter Complaint].
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represented by two private law firms.119 The complaint alleged that
American Express had "adopted and maintained a systematic practice
12°
of denying equal employment opportunities to women.
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged discrimination on the basis of sex
and age in promotion from the position of financial advisor to more
prestigious, higher paying positions, in compensation, and in
assignment of lucrative accounts and valuable leads. 121 In their
complaint, they alleged, among other things, that American Express
maintained an informal system of choosing "superstars" from
incoming recruits for training allotment, mentoring selection, and
assignment of important leads and accounts that, together with a
pervasive stereotype "both inside [American Express] and throughout
the industry" that "women do not have what it takes to succeed in the
financial planning business," resulted in discrimination against
women. 122
Before filing the complaint and consent decree, plaintiffs and
defendants retained a private mediator who facilitated negotiations
leading to the consent decree. 123 During the period of mediation,
defendants turned over to plaintiffs data and other information about
the makeup of and practices in their workplace, and counsel for the
plaintiffs retained a consultant to conduct a statistical analysis of the
data.'24 The consent decree, approved by the court on June 16, 2002,
provided for a settlement fund of $31 million. 25 Class counsel
together received $10.85 million, or 35% of the total settlement
amount. 126 The decree also provided for various injunctive relief
measures, including the creation of a central database for distribution
of leads and client accounts, establishment of objective criteria for
assignment of client accounts, and implementation of a diversity
training program. 127 At the parties' request, the court appointed a

119. See Complaint, supra note 118, at 33.
120. Id. at 9.
121. Id. at 9-10. The complaint also included allegations of discrimination in hiring
in the position of financial advisor, see id. at 5-6, but applicants were not included
within the scope of the settlement classes, see Order Approving Consent Decree,
supra note 118, at 2.
122. Complaint, supra note 118, at 9-10; see generally id. at 9-20.
123. The parties retained Linda Singer, a mediator with ADR Associates
experienced in the facilitation of negotiations in complex litigation, to mediate the
case. See Consent Decree, Kosen v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., at 3-4 (No. 1:
02CV00082) (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Consent Decree] (describing
information exchange and negotiation process).
124. See id. Although released to the parties, the information exchanged was
otherwise kept confidential. See id. at 41.
125. See Consent Decree, supra note 123, at 24; see generally id. at 23-37 (providing
details of monetary relief).
126. See id. at 25.
127. See id. at 13-23 (providing details of injunctive relief).
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private attorney as a special master to oversee implementation of the
decree.

121

2. Basic Characteristics
From these brief examples, one can begin to sketch some of the
basic characteristics of this recent litigation alongside the
characteristics of the private class action lawsuits brought in the early
days of Title VII enforcement:
Basic Characteristics of Early Title VII Class Action Lawsuits
Institutional Reform; Compensation
Goals:
Scope:
Plaintiffs:
Plaintiff Attorneys:
Plaintiff Attorney Fees:
Remedies:

Method of Resolution:
Enforcement:

Organizations; Industries
Employee/Applicant Class Members;
Membership Organizations
Public Interest Firms
Court-ordered Statutory Award to Prevailing
Party
Organizational Changes to Remove Structures
that Lock in Place Stratification; Affirmative
Action; Back Pay
Adjudication/Negotiation
Judicial Enforcement

Basic Characteristics of Recent Class Action Lawsuits:
Goals:

Institutional Reform; Compensation

Scope:
Plaintiffs:
Plaintiff Attorneys:
Plaintiff Attorney Fees:

Organizations
Employee/Applicant Class Members
Private Firms
Agreement in Settlement Subject to Court
Approval
Organizational Changes to Improve Hostile Work
Environment and to Reduce Discrimination by
Individuals; Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Negotiation
Private Enforcement (With Court as Last Resort)

Remedies:

Method of Resolution:
Enforcement:

128. See Order and Stipulation of Reference, Kosen v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors
(No. 1: 02CV00082) (D.D.C. 2002).
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In some respects, these recent lawsuits are no different from earlier
attempts to alter workplaces in ways that fulfill an employer's
obligation not to discriminate on the basis of protected characteristics.
Plaintiffs in these suits, just as in earlier Title VII litigation, seek class
action status to help broaden the inquiry to include organizational
sources of discrimination, only this time the problem being addressed
is one of decision-making context rather than institutional policy or
individual animus.
Moreover, once seen as efforts to change
organizational context to reduce future discrimination (as well as to
obtain monetary redress for past harm caused), these lawsuits sit
squarely within the long history of Title VII institutional reform
litigation. In other words, these lawsuits are more than just another
mass tort;129 they are a means of making antidiscrimination
enforcement litigation relevant to some of the more subtle forms of
discrimination common in the modern workplace.
In a number of respects, however, these recent lawsuits differ from
their earlier counterparts.
In particular, at least three largely
interrelated differences raise concern for the ability of these lawsuits
to trigger meaningful institutional reform.
The first of these
differences stems from changes in the nature of the problem and
remedy sought; the other two stem from more obvious changes in the
features of the lawsuits and processes for resolution and
implementation of solutions. First, unlike many of the early attempts
at structural reform under Title VII, the recent class action lawsuits
typically seek the type of organizational change that is intended to
reduce the incidence of discriminatory decisions based on subtle,
often unconscious bias in individuals rather than to remove systems or
structures that themselves perpetuate past segregation or
discrimination. These lawsuits, like their earlier counterparts, still
seek institutional reform, but they seek a type of reform that is more
complex than earlier reform attempts.1 30 Second, while plaintiffs in
early privately instituted Title VII lawsuits were often represented by
public interest firms with highly developed institutional agendas,"' the
129. In a recent article, Professor Michael Selmi suggests that employment
discrimination class action litigation has become "just another tort." Selmi, supra note
96, at 1300-01. Although Selmi is correct that many of the recent consent decrees
provide monetary funds without individualized injunctive relief, such as jobs or
promotions, many of the recent lawsuits do provide for systemic prospective relief
aimed at reducing future discrimination. This systemic prospective relief distinguishes
the recent cases from mass torts, wherein money damages are typically the primary
remedy for past harm and the defendant is not ordered to alter its business practices
in ways that will alleviate future harms. But see Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social
Policy Torts: Litigation as Legislative Strategy, 51 De Paul L. Rev. 493, 498 (2001)
(describing research project that examines the use of mass tort class actions to
"change the rules that govern industry-wide business practices").
130. See infra Part IV.A.
131. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing early reform efforts
undertaken by the NAACP LDF and other public interest firms). Public interest firms
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plaintiffs in recent class action lawsuits have been primarily
represented by private law firms, albeit sometimes private firms
specializing in public interest or employment litigation. 13 2 Third, while
early Title VII institutional reform litigation tended to proceed to
some degree through adjudication, resulting in judicial involvement in
formulation of remedy and oversight, the recent lawsuits have tended
to settle, sometimes before a complaint is even filed, resulting in
consent decrees between the parties that provide primarily for outside
rather than judicial oversight. 33 As I will discuss in greater detail in
Part IV, the complexity of this recent effort, coupled with the
privatization of the problem-solving process, raises particular concern
about the risk of private co-option of larger public antidiscrimination
goals.

are typically membership organizations that derive financial support primarily from
foundation grants or other private donations and/or governmental assistance. See
Edward Berlin et al., Public Interest Law, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 675 (1970).
132. Saperstein, Goldstein, Demchak & Baller, a private law firm that specializes in
civil rights class actions, has represented plaintiffs in a number of these cases. See, e.g.,
Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3370 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 25, 1996); Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., No. 95-1162-CIV-T-25E, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3381 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996); Barnhart v. Safeway Stores, No. S-92-0803,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22572 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1992); Stender v. Lucky Stores, 803
F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Berstein, a law firm well
known for its representation of plaintiffs in securities class actions and mass tort
litigation, has also been involved in recent cases. See, e.g., Home Depot, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3370. A variety of other private law firms have also represented
plaintiffs in recent actions. See, e.g., Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466
(S.D. Ohio 2001); Cooper v. Southern Co., 205 F.R.D. 596 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Reap v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 199 F.R.D. 536 (D.N.J. 2001); Beckmann v. CBS, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 608
(D. Minn. 2000). For a discussion of the decline of public law firms and the rise of
practice of public interest law in private law firms, see Debra S. Katz & Lynne
Bernabei, Practicing Public Interest Law in a Private Public Interest Law Firm: The
Ideal Setting to Challengethe Power,96 W. Va. L. Rev. 293 (1993).
133. Consent decrees were common even in earlier institutional reform efforts
under Title VII. See, e.g., supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text; see also Maimon
Schwarzschild, Public Law By Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the
Fairnessof Negotiated InstitutionalReform, 1984 Duke L.J. 887 (discussing earlier use
of consent decrees). However, earlier institutional reform suits were also adjudicated,
see, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th
Cir. 1969) (requiring employer to modify employment-referral systems and undertake
effective public information programs); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312
F. Supp. 977, 995-96 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (adopting extensive plan for ending
discriminatory seniority system); United States v. United Ass'n of Journeymen &
Apprentices, 314 F. Supp. 160 (D. Ind. 1969) (requiring revision of union's
apprenticeship program and retaining continued jurisdiction to insure compliance),
whereas almost all of the recent lawsuits like those that I have described have been
resolved by consent decrees that place implementation oversight primarily with
nonjudicial entities. But see Stender v. Lucky Stores, 803 F. Supp. 259, 335-36 (N.D.
Cal. 1992). The parties in this case, too, subsequently agreed to a settlement. See
Elaine Tassy, Lucky Stores Agrees To Settle Sex Bias Suit, L.A. Times, Dec. 17, 1993,
at D1.
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III. RECENT CASES: TARGETING WORKPLACE CONTEXT

The recent Title VII private class action lawsuits hold the potential
to address modern forms of discrimination by broadening the
antidiscrimination inquiry beyond discrete, identifiable bad actors to

target larger organizational sources of harm. Care must be taken,
however, not to let the large money stakes at issue in these cases
obscure the nature of the problem being addressed.3

At the outset,

the capability of these lawsuits for triggering meaningful reform
depends on their suitability for class treatment. Without class
certification, plaintiffs in these cases will be required to bring
individual lawsuits, which, as a practical matter, will tend to focus on
the state of mind of discrete decision makers rather than on larger

organizational influence. Although, as the examples illustrate, some
courts have been willing to certify recent cases for class treatment,
many have denied certification.

In this part, I shift gears a bit to

consider in some detail the principal objections raised by those courts
denying certification, objections that I suggest are driven in part by an
overemphasis on the damages dimension of these lawsuits. In doing
so, I seek to lay a conceptual foundation for placing lawsuits that seek

to identify organizational sources of modern discrimination within the
existing class action paradigm.
A. Common Question and Scope of Class for Class Treatment
In order to be certified for class action treatment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a proposed private class action must

satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a), numerosity, commonality,

typicality, and adequacy of representation,'35 and the lawsuit must fall
within one or more of the categories of class suits described in Rule
23(b). 136 A number of courts that have denied class certification in
134. Unlike their earlier counterparts, plaintiffs alleging discrimination in violation
of Title VII today can seek compensatory and punitive damages in addition to the
traditionally available equitable forms of relief. See infra note 175.
135. Rule 23(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
136. Rule 23(b) provides:
Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
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recent cases have done so on the ground that there exists no issue of
37
law or fact common to all members of the proposed class.
Conceptualizing the problem of modern workplace discrimination
purely in terms of discrete decisions made by individual decision
makers, these courts fail to recognize the broader structural influences
potentially at play across the organization. 3 '
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
137. It is well understood that the initial requirements for class certification
delineated in Rule 23(a), particularly the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation requirements, overlap significantly. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest
v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.
Both serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular
circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the
named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the
interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their
absence. Those requirements therefore also tend to merge with the
adequacy-of-representation requirement, although the latter requirement
also raises concerns about the competency of class counsel and conflicts of
interest.
Id. Therefore, although many courts deny certification for lack of commonality, these
courts often will also find a lack of typicality and inadequacy of representation. See,
e.g., Clayborne v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 211 F.R.D. 573 (D. Neb. 2002); Bacon v.
Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Zachery v. Texaco
Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1999); see also Reid v.
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (finding plaintiffs
failed to establish commonality and typicality requirements).
138. See, e.g., Bacon, 205 F.R.D. at 479 (holding that "commonality is not
established where the decisions allegedly constituting discrimination were made by
different supervisors and decisionmakers"); Allen v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 99C7614, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11043, at *26 (N.D. I11.
July 28, 2000) ("Because
promotion and pay decisions are made in different ways by different people
throughout the various departments of the CTA, there is no common nucleus of facts
and plaintiffs cannot establish commonality."); Betts v. Sundstrand Corp., No. 97C50188, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9743, at *22 (N.D. Ill.
June 21, 1999) ("The lack of a
centralized hiring decisionmaker, the sheer number of managers who hire applicants,
and the wide range of jobs included in the prospective class, indicate the lack of a
common nucleus of operative fact between class members."); Zachery, 185 F.R.D. at
239 (holding that subjectivity in evaluation and promotion decisions across
geographical units "would be useful evidence in an individual's claim of intentional
discrimination by that supervisor, [but] it does not lend itself readily to class
treatment where there are 523 autonomous supervisors in locations spread across the
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The court's reasoning in Zachery v. Texaco Exploration and
Production, Inc., provides a vivid example of this individualized
conception of the antidiscrimination inquiry.139 In that case, the
plaintiffs sought to obtain certification of a class of African-Americans
who were employed as hourly fieldworkers at a certain pay grade by
Texaco Exploration and Production and who held or had tried to
obtain a managerial, supervisory, or professional position, or who had
been otherwise affected by Texaco's allegedly racially discriminatory
policies and practices. 4 ° The plaintiffs alleged that Texaco's job
evaluation system resulted in discrimination because it left decision
making to the discretion of low-level supervisors without sufficient
guidance or stability. 4' The district court denied class certification,
concluding that the plaintiffs' claims lacked the commonality required
for class treatment.1 42 In doing so, the court explained that the
proposed class was spread across fifteen states in seventeen separate
business units and that the allegedly discriminatory decisions, "by the
Plaintiffs' own complaint," were often made by the lowest level
supervisor based on subjective criteria.'4 3 According to the court,
"[w]hile this would be useful evidence in an individual's claim of
intentional discrimination by that supervisor, it does not lend itself
readily to class treatment where there are 523 autonomous supervisors
in locations spread across the United States."'"
On the contrary, the question of fact or law common to all members
of a class in a case like this one should be whether the employer's
organizational structures, culture, and/or institutionalized decisionmaking practices together facilitate or permit discriminatory decisions
by individual decision makers against members of the class. A
decentralized decision-making process that leaves employment
decisions to the subjective discretion of local managers in a white,
male-dominated workplace might enable discrimination in a wide
range of jobs. So long as the named plaintiffs were subjected to
similar organizational structures and practices that allegedly resulted
in discrimination against class members, they should share a common
question of law or fact suitable for class treatment, even if the

United States"); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 (E.D.
Mo. 1998) ("[The] decentralized and subjective nature of the decisionmaking process
undermines the claim that age discrimination was [the defendant's] 'standard
operating procedure."'); Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold Med. Group, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 116,
129 (S.D. Tex. 1997) ("A class may not be based on discrimination occurring in
different departments, involving different decisionmakers.").
139. Zachery, 185 F.R.D. at 230.
140. Id. at 234.
141. Id. at 235.
142. Id. at 246.
143. Id. at 239.
144. Id.
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discrimination manifests itself at a variety of levels within an

organizational hierarchy or across geographical units.
This identification of organizational sources of discrimination as a
common ground for class treatment is consistent with the Supreme
Court's principal decision in this area, General Telephone Co. of the
Southwest v. Falcon.45 Decided in 1982, Falcon is often considered
largely responsible for the sharp decline in class action filings in the
1980s, and many courts in recent cases rely heavily on the decision
when denying class certification for lack of commonality or typicality.
Prior to Falcon, some courts had permitted any victim of
discrimination to maintain an "across-the-board" attack on all

unequal employment practices alleged to have been committed by the
employer pursuant to a policy of racial discrimination, with little or no
analysis of the Rule 23 requirements.'4 6 This meant that a plaintiff
who was denied a promotion could sue on behalf of himself and
others denied promotions as well as on behalf of applicants denied
initial employment so long as the named plaintiff alleged a larger

policy of discrimination. Plaintiffs in these cases were not required to
make a showing of a policy or practice of discrimination; mere
allegations of widespread discrimination were enough to qualify the
case for class action treatment.'47
Falcon involved allegations of discrimination against Mexican-

Americans by General Telephone. Mariano Falcon had been hired in
July 1969 as a groundman as part of a special recruitment and training
program for minorities.'48 Shortly thereafter, he was promoted to
lineman and then to lineman-in-charge. 4 9 In 1972, he was denied a
promotion to the job of field inspector, while two white employees

145. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
146. See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Ga. Highway
Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); see also Judith J. Johnson, Rebuilding the
Barriers: The Trend in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 19 Colum. Hum.
Rts. L. Rev. 1, 9-15 (1987) (describing the development of the across-the-board class
action); George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 688, 706-13
(1980) (same).
An earlier Supreme Court decision had rejected an extreme
application of the prevailing presumption in favor of certification, see E. Tex. Motor
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977), but courts did not uniformly pull
away from across-the-board certification until the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Falcon. See generally Rutherglen, supra, at 721-24 (explaining Rodriguez and reaction
by lower courts).
147. In some cases, plaintiffs did not even allege class-wide discrimination and
courts still treated their actions as representative of a broader class issue. See, e.g.,
Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 521 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that "it is not
essential that an action under Title VII be labeled a class action since it is 'perforce a
sort of class action for fellow employees similarly situated"' (quoting Tipler v. E.I.
duPont deNeMours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 130 (6th Cir. 1971))).
148. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 149.
149. Id.
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with less seniority were granted the promotion. 50 Falcon filed suit
against General Telephone alleging that it discriminated against
Mexican-Americans in transfers and promotions.'5 1 Relying on earlier
decisions sanctioning "across-the-board" attacks, the district court
certified a class that included both employees, who were allegedly
denied transfers and promotions, and applicants, who were allegedly
denied positions to begin with. 52 After a trial on the merits, the
district court found that General Telephone had engaged in a practice
of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in hiring, but not in
transfer or promotion.'53 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the
class certification, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
"whether the class action was properly maintained on behalf of both
employees who were denied promotion and applicants who were
denied employment." '5 4
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a class including both
applicants and employees was improper without any presentation
identifying questions of law or fact that were common to the claims of
Falcon and members of the class he sought to represent.15 5 The
district court had erred in presuming that Falcon's claim was typical of
other claims.156 Employment discrimination class actions must meet
the requirements of Rule 23, cautioned the Court, and in this case
there was nothing to indicate that the requirements of Rule 23(a)
were met.'57 Unless he could show otherwise, on the facts presented,
Falcon simply did not "possess the same interest and suffer the same
injury" as the applicant class members.158
With its decision in Falcon, the Supreme Court eliminated the
certification of "across-the-board" attacks brought by any victim of
discrimination based on mere allegations of systemic discrimination.
It did not, however, eliminate certification of a class simply because
the named plaintiff suffered a different manifestation of
discrimination from other class members. In a footnote, the Court
provided several examples of circumstances under which applicants
and employees might be part of the same class. It explained:
If petitioner used a biased testing procedure to evaluate both
applicants for employment and incumbent employees, a class action
on behalf of every applicant or employee who might have been
prejudiced by the test clearly would satisfy the commonality and
typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). Significant proof that an
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id. at 152.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 155.
155. Id. at 158-59.

156. Id.
157. Id. at 160.
158. See id. at 156 (internal quotations omitted).
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employer operated under a general policy of discrimination
conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees if
the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion
practices in the same general fashion, such as through entirely
subjective decisionmaking processes.159

Even after Falcon, therefore, class members will share a common
issue when the organizational context within which they work
facilitates discrimination that hinders their employment opportunities
in similar ways. As the Court's footnote reflects, organizational
structures that perpetuate past segregation as well as organizational
structures that facilitate present discrimination can provide a common
ground for class treatment. 16 0 In this way, the organizational cause of
the discrimination rather than the precise nature of the economic
injury suffered is the common question for the class.
The scope of the class in these cases, then, will be defined by the
reach of the organizational sources at issue. In some cases, the
organizational sources will include an array of practices that operate
together to facilitate discrimination at a number of levels within the
workplace, such as promotions, transfers, work assignments, and even
hiring. In those cases, a broadly defined class would be suitable. In
the Home Depot case, for example, the plaintiff class properly
included applicants as well as employees, for broad discretion in
hiring, job assignment, training, and evaluation, together with a maledominated management force holding stereotypical views about the
suitability of women for hands-on home improvement work, allegedly
led to discriminatory decision making in all levels of employment
opportunity.16 1 In other cases, in contrast, a more definite problem
159. Id. at 159 n.15.
160. Some courts have relied on the Court's reference to "entirely subjective
decision-making practices" to preclude certification in cases which involve both
subjective and objective factors. See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas,
723 F.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The district court's finding that the Bank
relied on two objective inputs-education and experience-in its necessarily
subjective hiring process .. . precludes reliance on th[e] 'general policy of
discrimination' exception"); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 477
(S.D. Ohio 2001) (finding no commonality because defendant did not employ
"entirely subjective" criteria); Betts v. Sundstrand Corp., No. 97-C50188, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9743, at *21 (N.D. I11.June 21, 1999) (stating that "where there are
objective factors, even a generally subjective process will not satisfy Rule 23's
commonality and typicality requirements"); Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold Med. Group,
Inc., 178 F.R.D. 116, 132 (S.D. Tex. 1997) ("Where... there are objective factors,
even a generally subjective process will not satisfy the typicality and commonality
requirements.").
Subjectivity in decision making is problematic, however, not
because it is entirely devoid of objective elements, but because research shows that
people are more likely to rely on stereotypes and to act on discriminatory bias when
decision-making processes lack guidance or repercussion. See supra notes 37-45 and
accompanying text. Even practices that are not entirely subjective, therefore, may
facilitate discrimination within an organization.
161. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3370 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 25, 1996).
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will be identified. In the American Express case, plaintiffs argued that
the choosing of "superstars," together with a male workforce culture
biased against women, resulted in discrimination against women in
training, mentoring, and promotion. 162 And in the Coca-Cola case, the
plaintiffs identified a performance evaluation system and word-ofmouth promotion recommendation system that allegedly enabled
Applicants for
discrimination against African-Americans.16 3
employment would not be included within the plaintiff class in either
of these cases, for neither choosing superstars from recruits nor
performance and promotion systems would reasonably extend to
hiring decisions.
One might expect plaintiffs in cases like Coca-Cola and American
Express, in order to obtain a broader class, to simply expand their
allegations to include more generalized subjective decision making.
However, mere allegation of widespread subjectivity should not be
enough to warrant certification of a broad class. Rather, class
certification in cases where the plaintiffs allege organizational sources
of discrimination should require some evidentiary showing that the
organizational structures, institutionalized practices, and/or culture
within the defendant's workplace exist and enable discrimination in
individuals against members of the class." 6 In addition to evidence of
relevant statistical disparities, this showing might include evidence
obtained from the employer concerning its structures and practices of
decision making, anecdotal evidence from employees concerning
informal practices that enable discrimination, and/or expert testimony
concerning the operation of bias within a particular organizational
context. 165 Together, this evidence should suggest organizational
sources of discrimination that would apply across the proposed class.
So long as the evidence provides a reasonable basis for believing that
discrimination is enabled by organizational context throughout the
proposed class, however, the class members should share a common
issue sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a).
In certain circumstances, of course, variations among class members
may require certification of subclasses. For example, some courts
162. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
163. See Amended Complaint, Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 98-CV-3679, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211 (N.D. Ga. July 16, 1999).
164. Although the Supreme Court has cautioned that a class certification analysis is
not an evaluation of the merits of the case, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 177 (1974), most courts require some precertification evidence showing the
existence of a class, see, e.g., Nelson v. United States Steel Corp., 709 F.2d 675, 679-80
(11th Cir. 1983). Moreover, requiring some showing of organizational sources of
discrimination that apply across the proposed class is consistent with Falcon. See
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15.
165. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 428, 441-42
(D.D.C. 2002) (presenting evidence of decentralized, subjective promotion practices
and statistical evidence showing under-representation of African Americans in
higher-paying jobs).
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have declined to certify recent cases for class treatment in part
because the plaintiffs relied on statistical disparities across
geographical units to support an allegation that the employers'
decision-making practices resulted in discrimination against members
of a protected group.'66 While it is true that evidence of companywide disparities does not necessarily mean that each geographic unit
will have experienced similar disparities, evidence of statistical
disparities, whether generalized or specific, should be sufficient to
support a reasonable inference at the class certification stage that
organizational structures are enabling discrimination against members
of the class as a whole. To the extent the employer can show that
certain units do not exhibit disparities, the court might create
subclasses for those areas (or, depending on the circumstances,
exclude those areas from the class altogether), 167 but the common
issue is the same: whether the employer's organizational structures
and/or institutionalized
practices enable discrimination against
1 68
members of the class.

Subclasses might also be required in some cases to protect the
interests of plaintiffs seeking only systemic change in the form of
injunctive relief. Lawsuits alleging widespread discrimination enabled
by organizational context are likely to involve some plaintiffs who

cannot point to specific injury compensable with monetary damages as
well as plaintiffs who can point to monetarily compensable injury. To
the extent that plaintiffs seeking substantial monetary relief have

interests

that diverge from their injunctive-only

counterparts,

subclasses may be warranted.
That plaintiffs seek monetary damages as well as injunctive relief in

166. See, e.g., Abram v. UPS, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 424, 431 (E.D. Wis. 2001); Robinson
v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 175 F.R.D. 46, 48-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd sub
nom. Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 293 (2d Cir. 1999);
Boykin v. Viacom Inc., No. 96-CIV.8559, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17872, at *11-*12
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1997).
167. A finding that an employer did not discriminate with respect to certain
geographical units might also affect the scope of the remedy. See Hodgson v. Corning
Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1973).
168. This understanding that variation among geographical or business units might
warrant creation of subclasses illustrates the overlap between the commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a). Certainly, if
organizational context in a particular unit so diverges from the context of the
organization as a whole that it requires a separate subclass or exclusion from the class,
employees of that unit would not have claims typical of employees from other units
and would not be able to adequately represent their interests. This is not to say,
however, that any variation in organizational context across units will require
separate subclasses and named representative plaintiffs, for organizational context
will naturally vary to some degree from one workplace unit to the next. Rather, it is
simply to recognize that in those cases where the organizational context in a particular
unit is so different from the class as a whole that it either falls outside the class
altogether or requires a separate subclass, then employees working within that
distinct organizational context would not have claims typical of the class as a whole.
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these cases, though, should not be permitted to obscure the
commonality of the underlying problem. Individuals may be harmed
by discrete discriminatory decisions in a variety of ways, but it is the
organizational cause of the discrimination rather than the specifics of
individualized circumstances that provides the common question for
class treatment in these cases.
B. Beyond Commonality: Damages and Class Certification
Courts have also denied class treatment in recent employment
discrimination cases on the ground that certification is not proper
under any category or combination of categories of Rule 23(b).
Several of these courts carry over into their Rule 23(b) analysis a
conceptualization of the problem of discrimination posed by recent
cases as one of individuals acting in isolation rather than in larger
organizational context. 169 The reasoning provided by these courts
differs little from the reasoning provided with respect to commonality
under Rule 23(a). Other courts, however, relying primarily on the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
Corp.,17 raise distinct concerns about the propriety of class treatment
when employment discrimination plaintiffs seek money damages as
well as injunctive relief as remedies. A look at some of the issues
raised under Rule 23(b) should reveal the propriety of class
certification in recent cases, even when plaintiffs seek substantial
monetary as well as injunctive relief.
Before 1991, it was well established that employment discrimination
lawsuits were suitable for certification as class actions under Rule
23(b)(2), which provides for class treatment when "the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole." 17' Although Title VII plaintiffs during the pre-1991 period
could recover money in the form of back pay and front pay, those
remedies, traditionally considered equitable, were permitted as part of
a 23(b)(2) employment discrimination class, despite the individual
issues thereby created. Typically, where members of an employment
discrimination class sought individualized relief, the court would
bifurcate the proceedings into a "liability" phase and a "remedial"
169. See, e.g., Reap v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 199 F.R.D. 536, 549 (D.N.J. 2001); Robinson
v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 197 F.R.D. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), rev'd, 267
F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 951 (2002).
170. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
171. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The Advisory Committee Notes to the Rule confirm
that civil rights actions "where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully
against a class" qualify for class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2), for injunctive and
declaratory relief to the class as a whole is often a principal remedy in these cases.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) Advisory Committee Note, 1966 Amendments.
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phase.
If the plaintiffs could show that the employer had
discriminated against the class as a whole, then class-wide liability
attached and class members received generalized injunctive and/or
declaratory relief as well as a presumption of discrimination for
individualized relief."i
The employer could avoid providing
individualized relief in the remedial stage only if it could establish a
lawful reason for an adverse employment action against a member of
the class.173 Because back pay and front pay were considered
equitable remedies, both stages of the lawsuit were tried to the judge
rather than to a jury. After making a determination as to liability with
respect to the class as a whole, the judge (or an appointed special
master) would hear individualized issues in the remedial phase of the
litigation. 74
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to allow, for the first time,
legal as well as equitable relief. Specifically, as noted earlier, Title VII
now provides plaintiffs with the right to seek compensatory and
punitive damages." 5 In addition, seeking legal relief triggers the right
to a jury trial in Title VII cases, which means that a jury rather than a
judge will decide issues of liability and remedy tied to the legal
claims.7 6 These remedial and procedural changes in the Civil Rights
Act immediately raised concerns in the courts about the propriety of
Rule 23(b) certification of employment discrimination lawsuits in
which plaintiffs seek compensatory and/or punitive damages in
addition to equitable relief.
The Fifth Circuit in Allison was the first court of appeals to address
class action issues raised by the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act. 177 In that 1998 decision, the court held that as a general rule

172. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361-62 (1977).
173. See id.
174. See Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions §§ 24.11924.121 (3d ed. 1992).
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000) (allowing compensation for "future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses"); id. § 1981a(b)(1) (allowing for
punitive damages if the employer discriminated "with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual"). Total
recovery for compensatory and punitive damages is capped at a maximum of $300,000
per plaintiff. See id. § 1981a(b)(3). The legislative history suggests that Congress
intended to "confirm that the principle of antidiscrimination is as important as the
principle that prohibits assaults, batteries and other intentional injuries to people,"
H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 15 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 553, to
"ensure compensation commensurate with the harms suffered by victims of
intentional discrimination," id. at 18, and to "encourage citizens to act as private
attorneys general" in enforcement, id. at 65. For a discussion of the legislative history
of the damages provision more generally, see Daniel F. Piar, The UncertainFuture of
Title VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 305, 30609.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
177. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
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employment discrimination lawsuits in which plaintiffs seek
compensatory or punitive damages cannot be certified for class

treatment.'78 In doing so, the court limited Rule 23(b)(2) class actions
to those claims seeking to recover only "incidental" damages, defined
as "damages that flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on

the claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief"
and that are "capable of computation by means of objective standards
and not dependent in any significant way on the intangible, subjective
differences of each class member's circumstances."1 7 9
Because

compensatory damages (and punitive damages) require individualized
proof, said the court, employment discrimination claims seeking these
remedies cannot be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). 18 ° Interestingly, for
much the same reason, the court also rejected a "hybrid" approach
under which the plaintiffs' claims for compensatory and punitive
damages would be certified under Rule 23(b)(3), with the remainder
certified under Rule 23(b)(2)."'
According to the court, the

requirement that common issues predominate for Rule 23(b)(3)
treatment was not satisfied when money damages were sought, for
individualized issues concerning monetary relief to particular
individuals would overwhelm any common issues concerning the class
as a whole."8 2

Although the court's decision rested largely on its

narrow construction of the language of Rule 23(b), the court also
voiced concerns about diverging interests that might violate class
members' due process rights, the potential for violating the Seventh
Amendment prohibition on jury reexamination, and the difficulty in
managing individualized issues to be tried by juries.183
A number of commentators have debated the merits of the Allison
court's construction of Rule 23(b), 84 and I will not revisit those
arguments in detail here. Instead, I seek to highlight the problems of
the Allison approach from a practical perspective and to lay the

groundwork more generally for an approach to class certification in
178. Id.
179. Id. at 415.
180. See id. at 415-18.
181. See id. at 418-21. The court suggested that plaintiffs in these cases might obtain
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) by foregoing claims for monetary damages in the
class suit. See id. at 418 n.13. At least one other court, however, has denied
certification in cases in which plaintiffs have refrained from seeking monetary
damages on the ground that unnamed class members might be bound by that decision
and unable to seek individual damages in later suits. See Zachery v. Texaco
Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 242-45 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
182. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 419-20.
183. See id.
184. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 96, at 415; Harvey S. Bartlett III, Comment,
Determining Whether a Title VII Plaintiff Class's "Aim is True": The Legacy of
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. for Employment Discrimination Class Certification
Under Rule 23(b)(2), 74 Tul. L. Rev. 2163 (2000); Lesley Frieder Wolf, Note, Evading
Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certification After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100
Colum. L. Rev. 1847 (2000).
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employment discrimination cases like those recently filed, an
approach that addresses concerns raised by the 1991 Act without
preventing class certification altogether. The Fifth Circuit starts from
the premise that "the class action device exists primarily, if not solely,
to achieve a measure of judicial economy, which benefits the parties
as well as the entire judicial system," ' 5 but class actions in the
discrimination context do more than advance judicial efficiency; they
have long been used to highlight systemic problems, to expand the
legal inquiry and remedial formulation to address sources of
discrimination that may otherwise go unaddressed. 86 In this way,
recent privately-instituted class action lawsuits seeking significant
structural reform are a crucial part of the modern antidiscrimination
project, for, as I have argued, they serve to trigger change in the
organizational structures that continue to perpetuate discrimination in
the modern workplace. Without class certification, courts are faced
with a problem of individualized discrimination, a problem for which
they are often unwilling or even unable to consider structural sources
or solutions.
Moreover, increased involvement of private attorney firms in
enforcement litigation can serve as a much-needed supplement to
public enforcement efforts.
The 1991 amendments authorizing
compensatory and, in some circumstances, punitive damages, in
addition to providing individuals with full relief, provide an incentive
for privately-instituted class-wide litigation. Increased settlement or
judgment awards typically result in increased attorneys fees. 87
Accordingly, private attorneys are more willing to spend the money
required to litigate a complex case of widespread employment
discrimination, taking on a task long left largely to the government
and other public interest entities.
With careful attention to underlying concerns about due process,
jury reexamination, and manageability raised by claims seeking
monetary damages, Title VII lawsuits like those recently filed are
suitable for class treatment. To begin with, the due process rights of
class members in these cases can be protected by providing notice and
an opportunity to opt out on all claims for monetary relief. Due
185. Allison, 151 F.3d at 410.
186. In theory, a single plaintiff's claim should be capable of exposing structural,
systemic causes of workplace discrimination. Group-based claims, however, are more
readily recognized as efforts to target organizational causes and have historically been
more useful for effecting institutional solutions. See supra note 79 and accompanying
text.
187. Attorneys fees in class action litigation are calculated using two methods: the
percentage of recovery method and/or the hourly or "lodestar" method. Even the
lodestar calculation can take into account degree of success. See, e.g., Spegon v.
Catholic Bishop, 175 F.3d 544, 557 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Once the district court reaches an
amount using the lodestar determination, it may then adjust that award in light of the
plaintiff's 'level of success."').
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process concerns arise when class members' interests diverge. Where
class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is sought for an alleged
group harm, there is a presumption of cohesion and unity between
absent members and the class representatives such that adequate
representation

will generally

safeguard

absent

class

members'

interests. In these circumstances, a right to opt out of the class action
makes no sense. In fact, in these circumstances it is difficult to
identify an individual cause of action that could be sued upon
independently from the class.188

Although class members may

disagree about the form that injunctive relief should take, they cannot
achieve an alternate solution by suing separately. Rather, the finding
of liability and corresponding remedy will necessarily involve the
collective group.

Where relief is sought for specific damage incurred by individuals
within the class, in contrast, the class members' interests begin to
diverge, for now individuals have a right to litigate their cases
separately and to achieve remedies independent of the collective
action. 189 In these circumstances, the class action is an aggregation of

individual actions, and due process arguably requires an opportunity

to opt out of aggregated class resolution.' 90 Class members still share

a common interest in achieving organizational reform in these cases,
but they have a right to litigate their damage claims individually.
Although due process arguably requires an opportunity to opt out of
the class resolution of damage claims, this due process right should
not preclude class treatment in cases where plaintiffs seek both

significant institutional reform and monetary relief for their injuries.
Rather, courts can satisfy these due process concerns by providing
188. For a similar point made in the context of considering the need for notice and
opt out in class actions generally, see Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process,
and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1057, 1058-62
(2002).
189. In fact, Rule 23 requires that members of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
the category that usually encompasses suits for money damages, be provided notice
and an opportunity to opt out of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
190. See George Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and Preclusion in Title VII Class
Actions, 69 Va. L. Rev. 11, 26 (1983) (noting that some individual class members may
have claims for monetary relief "stronger than [those] of most other class members,
or worth more, or in other respects sufficiently distinctive" such that "[n]otice and the
right to opt out" may be warranted); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 95 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (noting that the underlying premise of the (b)(2) class-that its members suffer
from a common injury properly addressed by class-wide relief-"begins to break
down when the class seeks to recover back pay or other forms of monetary relief to be
allocated based on individual injuries"); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 845-47 (1999) (suggesting that damage class actions require notice and
opportunity to opt out); Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The
Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort
Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 461, 472 (1997)
(arguing that "the right to assert one's own rights" requires opt-out); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class
Members, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1148,1174 (1998).
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notice and an opportunity to opt out for claims seeking monetary
relief. Some courts have done this by certifying a class under Rule
23(b)(2) and providing notice and opt out for monetary relief, 9' while

others have certified a hybrid class action, with claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief falling under Rule 23(b)(2) and claims for
monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3). 2

Nor should the Seventh Amendment prevent certification in these
cases. The Seventh Amendment provides in relevant part that "the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
19 3
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States.'

Under Title VII, parties now have a right to a jury trial when plaintiffs
seek compensatory or punitive damages. This will mean that a jury
must decide liability as well as legal remedies. Moreover, because it is

highly unlikely that the same jury will sit for both the liability and
remedial phases of an employment discrimination class action lawsuit,

successive juries may be involved in cases that do not settle before the
remedial phase. However, although the Reexamination Clause of the

Seventh Amendment forbids reexamination of issues by separate,
successive juries, it does not forbid successive juries from deciding
separate factual issues. In fact, courts have long bifurcated claims for
determination by separate juries, and it is well settled that these
separate juries meet constitutional requirements so long as the juries
do not decide overlapping factual issues.'94
The key to Seventh Amendment concerns in these cases, then, is in
delineating factual issues for separate jury determination in a way that
provides no overlap. In the employment discrimination context this
task should be relatively straightforward, for the liability phase
typically involves the question of whether the employer has engaged
in discrimination against the class as a whole, and the remedial phase
typically involves questions particular to individual plaintiffs: whether
the employer has a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse action taken
191. See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.
2001); Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1127 (E.D. Ark.
2000).
192. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1999)
(suggesting possibility of bifurcation into 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) class action). Courts
adopting this hybrid approach regularly defer the decision whether to certify a
damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) until after liability is established. See, e.g., Beck v.
Boeing Co., 60 Fed. Appx. 38, 39 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing district court's
certification of punitive damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) as premature); Shores v.
Publix Super Mkts, Inc., No. 95-1162-CIV-T-25(E), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996) (deferring decision on treatment of damages stage).
193. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
194. See Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 705, 729-40
(2000) (examining constitutional limits on bifurcation and detailing a variety of uses
of bifurcation). For an argument that even some overlap of issues in a bifurcated trial
does not violate the Seventh Amendment, see Patrick Wooley, Mass Tort Litigation
and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 499 (1998).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

against a particular plaintiff, and, if not, whether and to what extent
the plaintiff has suffered compensable harm. Juries should be able to
make these determinations in most cases without confusion or
uncertainty about the factual issues presented for resolution by each.
There remains the problem of manageability in the remedial phase
of the litigation. If the remedial phase requires separate juries for
individual plaintiffs or small groups of plaintiffs, the argument goes,
the case may become unmanageable for the court. 95 As a practical
matter, of course, recent cases illustrate that it is unlikely that
adjudication will proceed to this stage. Rather, the parties are likely
to settle, devising remedies that take shape in agreed-upon consent
decrees. Even assuming that some cases will reach the remedial stage,
though, as courts must do when considering class certification at the
outset of the suit, manageability concerns should not preclude
certification. In fact, it seems highly unlikely that these cases will be
any less manageable than some of the mass tort class actions that have
proceeded through the remedial stage of litigation.' 96 Substantial
issues of liability will have already been decided, leaving only
questions about particular instances of discrimination and amount of
damages for the jury to determine when considering remedies.
Recognizing the importance of recent cases for private attempts to
address organizational sources of discrimination, courts should, in
most cases, be able to devise ways to manage multiple juries, for
example, by grouping plaintiffs for jury consideration and/or using
special masters to assist with jury management at the remedial phase
without undermining either individual interests in fair adjudication of
their claims or the larger public interest in addressing organizational
sources of discrimination.
These recent Title VII lawsuits hold the capacity to trigger an
antidiscrimination inquiry that includes organizational as well as
individual sources of discrimination. Once understood as efforts to
address institutional or organizational sources of discrimination, much
like their earlier Title VII public and private counterparts, the
usefulness and propriety of class certification in these cases becomes
195. Some courts have used manageability concerns as a basis for denying
certification altogether, see, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 41920 (5th Cir. 1998); others have reserved judgment on certification of damage claims
until after liability has been determined, see, e.g., Morgan v. UPS, Inc., 169 F.R.D.
349, 358 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class with respect to liability and
deferring certification regarding damages until establishment of liability); Shores v.
Publix Super Mkts., Inc., No. 95-1162-CIV-T-25(E), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381, at
*28-*29 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996) (same); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3370, at *16-*18 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1996) (same).
196. See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 Tex. L.
Rev. 1821, 1826 (1995) (describing categories of mass torts in which courts have had
relatively little management difficulty). For a discussion of some of the variations on
aggregating individual tort claims, see Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the

Aggregate: Relationships,Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 296 (1996).
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clear. Class certification provides private Title VII enforcement
efforts with a procedural mechanism for considering causes and
solutions to modern discrimination at the organizational as well as at
the individual level.
IV. RECENT CASES: EFFECTING MEANINGFUL CHANGE
Accepting that class action treatment is useful and proper to
broaden the inquiry to include organizational sources of
discrimination, however, does not mean that Title VII lawsuits like
those that I have described will trigger meaningful institutional
reform. On the contrary, as a number of socio-legal scholars have
emphasized for years, law does not simply act upon organizations.
Rather, it both interacts with and is shaped by various intermediaries
in a complex process of organizational implementation. In this part, I
turn to evaluate the potential of recent class action lawsuits to trigger
change in organizational context that has some real impact on the
incidence of discrimination in the workplace.
A. Potentialfor Co-Option
Enforcement litigation can provide a foundation from which to
build meaningful compliance measures. Judicial decrees requiring
certain behavior by employers delineate boundaries of lawful conduct
and may provide examples of appropriate compliance strategies.'97 By
the same token, consent decrees like those recently agreed upon can
provide valuable foundational information for other organizations
seeking to avoid Title VII liability. 9 s The shape of the organizational
changes in these consent decrees becomes important, therefore, not
just from the perspective of the organization immediately affected
pursuant to the decree, but also from the perspective of larger
organizational fields, where organizations search for compliance
mechanisms.
And yet, enforcement litigation can also lead to the adoption of
merely symbolic reform. Research on the process of implementation
of civil rights laws in the workplace reveals the influence of
intermediaries both on the forms of institutional change triggered by
the law and on the development of the law itself. There is reason to
197. See Special Project: The Remedial Process in InstitutionalReform Litigation,78
Colum. L. Rev. 784, 795 (1978) (explaining that institutional reform orders sometimes
serve as models for later court orders).
198. Information concerning compliance mechanisms in consent decrees can reach
other organizations through the news media and through personnel and EEO
management professionals. See supra note 53 (citing news reports of consent decrees);
Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 Am. J. of Soc. 1401, 1410,
1434-35 (1990) (discussing the role of personnel professionals in diffusion of
organizational compliance mechanisms).
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believe, in other words, that through the process of implementation
antidiscrimination law is "mediated" by the organizations it seeks to
regulate as well as by members of the managerial, personnel, and legal
professions,199 who interpret, inform, and frame its meaning and
compliance requirements.0 °
Because these intermediaries,
particularly the organizations being regulated, often have interests
that conflict with the substantive goals of civil rights laws,2 1
intermediary mediation can result in changes in formal organizational
structures that symbolize compliance, but that fail to effectuate
improvements for women and minorities in the workplace.2 °2
Moreover, over time, as other organizations adopt similar strategies,
irrespective of their technical value, these intermediary-mediated
changes become institutionalized and can lead to legal definitions of
compliance that incorporate the merely symbolic changes into formal
legal doctrine, thereby completing the cycle of mediation of the law. 03
Sociologist Lauren Edelman describes this process as exhibiting the
"endogeneity" of law, and in her work she, together with various
colleagues, has documented the influence of intermediaries on the
development of Title VII law. In her article, The Endogeneity of
Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, for
example, Edelman traces the use of internal grievance procedures as a
Title VII compliance mechanism from professional personnel
networks to organizations to legal acceptance 0 4 She shows that when
199. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerializationof
Law, 106 Am. J. of Soc. 1589 (2001) (examining the role of professionals in reframing
understandings of law and legal constructs) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Diversity];
Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of
Wrongful Discharge, 26 Law & Soc'y Rev. 47 (1992) (examining professional
construction of the doctrine of wrongful discharge).
200. Sociologist Lauren Edelman identifies three characteristics of equal
employment law that make it particularly susceptible to intermediary mediation: the
meaning of compliance is ambiguous, leaving ample room for interpretation; it tends
to focus on procedural change rather than change in outcome, making merely
symbolic reform more difficult to detect; and its enforcement mechanisms are
relatively weak. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:
OrganizationalMediation of Civil Rights Laws, 97 Am. J. of Soc. 1531, 1536 (1992).
201. Organizations have an interest in symbolizing compliance without upsetting
managerial structures. See id. at 1535; Chambliss, supra note 201 (examining
displacement of conflict inherent in legal regulation of the employment relation and
employers' interests in deciding whom to hire, fire, and promote).
202. It is possible, of course, for formal structural changes in response to law to
have symbolic value and substantive effect. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Stephen
M. Petterson, Symbols and Substance in Organizational Response to Civil Rights
Laws, 17 Res. in Soc. Stratification and Mobility 107, 109 (1999) (noting that all EEO
structures have symbolic value, "symboliz[ing] attention to the law," but that some
symbolic structures also have substantive effects, producing "real improvements in
the workforce status of women and minorities"); see id. at 116-35 (examining impact
of generalized and specialized EEO structures on workforce representation).
203. See Edelman et al., Diversity, supra note 199, at 1595-97 (describing process by
which law is shaped by institutional compliance mechanisms).
204. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance
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personnel professionals first started framing grievance procedures as a
mechanism to avoid legal liability in sexual harassment lawsuits in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, their assertions had little legal
foundation.2 °5
As organizations began to implement grievance
procedures and to present a grievance-procedure defense in the
courts, however, the law began to recognize those procedures as a
source of protection from liability. 206 Today, grievance procedures are
part of an established affirmative defense in certain hostile work
environment cases.20 7
In a recent article, Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp provides a
particularly useful illustration of how institutional reform embodied in
consent decrees may constitute part of a larger process of
organizational mediation of law.20 8 Specifically, she documents the
increasing reliance on diversity and sexual harassment training by
employers seeking to avoid Title VII liability, with settlements and
consent decrees regularly including diversity training as one element
of agreed-upon institutional reform.20 9 Some management attorneys,
she relates, have suggested that diversity training will eventually
become a defense to liability under Title VII; 2

°

indeed, the Supreme

Court has already implicitly embraced training as a way in which to
avoid punitive damages under Title V11 211 and as a way to avoid
Proceduresas Rational Myth, 105 Am. J. of Soc. 406-54 (1999).
205. See id. at 413-14, 432-33.
206. See id. at 435-44. The authors conducted a content analysis of cases from
1964-1997 to determine when the law began to recognize grievance procedures as a
source of protection for employers. See id. This analysis supports their contention
that "judicial deferral to organizational grievance procedures [took] place primarily in
the 1990s, quite a few years after the personnel profession's initial claims of the value
of internal grievance procedures." Id. at 444.
207. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-72 (1986), the Court
suggested in dicta that an employer might avoid liability if plaintiff failed to use an
established internal grievance procedure. More recently, in Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 807 (1998), the Court articulated an affirmative defense such that when a
supervisor creates a hostile work environment but does not take any tangible
employment action, a defending employer may avoid liability if it can show "(a) that
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise." For a discussion of this doctrinal development as evincing
a shift in conceptualization of the deterrent role of Title VII liability, see Susan
Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure:
Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in
Employment DiscriminationLaw, 22 Berk. J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 7-13 (2001).
208. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 207, at 25-27.
209. See id. Both the American Express and Coca Cola Consent Decrees provided
for "diversity training." See supra notes 118 & 123 and accompanying text.
210. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 208, at 23.
211. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544-45 (1999) (providing a
shield from punitive damages if the employer "engage[s] in good faith efforts to
comply with Title VII," encouraging employers to "adopt antidiscrimination policies
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liability in certain hostile work environment cases.2 12 At first glance,
diversity training seems an obvious way for an employer to inform its
workforce about its commitment to equal opportunity and about the
dangers of subtle forms of discriminatory bias, but, as Bisom-Rapp
points out, the specific form of diversity training can greatly influence
its effectiveness.213 Some forms of diversity training, social science
research suggests, can actually reinforce existing stereotypes, create
new stereotypes, and/or increase hostility and misunderstanding
between employees.214 Simply because diversity training becomes a
common compliance mechanism, therefore, does not mean that all
diversity training efforts will result in real workplace reform.
Several differences between recent class action institutional reform
efforts and earlier Title VII reform efforts raise particular concern
about the risk of implementing merely symbolic change without any
meaningful impact on the incidence of discrimination in the
workplace. First, the contextualized, ambiguous, ongoing nature of
the problem presented in recent cases renders efforts at institutional
reform more susceptible to mediation by various intermediaries than
Title VII institutional reform efforts of the past several decades.
Second, the private nature of the problem-solving process in these
recent cases tends to discourage a broader institutional agenda and to
insulate solutions from public oversight. In the next subsection, I
examine these differences and consider their significance for the
capacity of recent class action lawsuits to effect meaningful reform,
before turning to explore the judiciary's role in protecting against
private co-option of larger public antidiscrimination goals.
1. Complexity of the Problem and the Solution
Title VII reform efforts have long been located within the "public
law" paradigm of adjudication.215 Remedies are not always dictated
by rights;2 16 remedial implementation requires ongoing supervisory

and to educate their personnel on Title VII's prohibitions").
212. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (creating affirmative defense for employers when
supervisor engaged in harassing conduct).
213. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 207, at 38-44 (reviewing some of the social
science research on the effects of diversity training).
214. See id.
215. The distinction between public law and private law models of adjudication is
often traced to Abram Chayes and his article, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976). Chayes included employment discrimination
as well as school desegregation and prisoners' or inmates' rights cases as "avatars of
this new form of litigation." Id. at 1284.
216. See id. at 1293-94 ("The form of relief does not flow ineluctably from the
liability determination, but is fashioned ad hoc."); id. at 1298-1302; Colin S. Diver,
The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public
Institutions, 65 Va. L. Rev. 43, 50 (1979) ("Pronouncing [public law] rights, however,
does nothing to illuminate the remedy.").
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relationships; 217 change is aimed at prospective alteration of conditions
of wrongdoing as well as retrospective attempts to remedy past
wrongs.
Recent efforts at Title VII-triggered institutional change
also fall within this paradigm, but they present an even greater
remedial complexity than that involved in past Title VII institutional
reform efforts. This remedial complexity suggests the need for a
collaborative, flexible process of remedial design that may increase
the risk that these lawsuits will trigger symbolic rather than
meaningful organizational reform.
The type of organizational change sought in recent lawsuits differs
significantly from that of most earlier Title VII reform efforts. Recent
efforts typically seek the type of organizational change that will
reduce the incidence of subtle, often unconscious, day-to-day forms of
discrimination by individuals in the workplace.
This effort at
organizational change naturally reflects the complexity of the problem
being addressed. Organizational change triggered by recent cases like
those that I have identified will result in greater equity and reduced
workplace discrimination only if the operation of discriminatory bias
in individual decision making is minimized. In this way, the Title VII
aim, reduction in workplace discrimination, is one step removed from
the method of attaining that aim, change in organizational context.
In earlier Title VII institutional reform suits, in contrast, plaintiffs
tended to seek and courts tended to implement types of
organizational change that immediately and directly opened up
opportunities for minorities and women.
More specifically,
institutional reform efforts have tended to focus on three main
methods of increasing workplace equality: removing barriers to
attainment of and movement between jobs through restructuring of
seniority systems and elimination of discriminatory test and
educational requirements; increasing the pool of minority applicants
through broadened recruitment efforts and dissemination of
information regarding job openings; and increasing numbers of
women and minorities in previously segregated work areas through
imposition of numerical outcome goals. Each of these remedial
efforts seeks to change the makeup of the workforce or to alter the
organizational practices and structures in important ways, but, unlike
the reforms of recent cases, they are not specifically intended to
reduce the incidence of ongoing discrimination by individuals and/or
groups.
One way in which Title VII organizational reform efforts have
sought to increase equity in the workplace is by eliminating those
217. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 28
(1979).
218. See id. at 22 (describing structural reform as focusing "on a social condition,
not incidents of wrongdoing, and also on the bureaucratic dynamics that produce that
condition").
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organizational structures that serve to lock in job segregation. Along
these lines, organizations have been required to restructure seniority
systems and to eliminate testing and educational requirements that
are not shown to be job related and justified by business necessity.2 19
This type of remedial reform was instrumental in the early Title VII
era in opening opportunities for minorities in otherwise all-white
areas of the workforce, 22° and it continues to serve an important role
in limiting structural barriers to advancement of women and
minorities in the workplace. 221 The focus of this type of reform,
however, is on the direct structural causes of continuing inequity
rather than on the interplay between individual decision makers and
the structures within which they work. Once the discriminatory tests
and/or diploma requirements are eliminated and the seniority systems
restructured, minorities should immediately gain greater access to jobs
that they had been denied on the basis of these systems.
Expanded recruitment efforts and dissemination of information are
additional ways in which Title VII enforcement litigation has opened
up opportunities for minorities and women.222 Here, too, however,
the structural reform imposed typically has an immediate impact on
the makeup of the workplace, or at least on the makeup of the
applicant pool. Although it is true that the number of minority
applicants will increase as a result of publicity or expanded
recruitment efforts only if targeted individuals actually choose to
apply for open positions, information dissemination as a remedy

219. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (requiring elimination
of testing and diploma requirements); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517
F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975) (restructuring seniority system); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., Synthetic Rubber Plant, 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) (requiring
elimination of diploma and testing requirements, residency requirement, and loss of
seniority in transfer); United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973)
(restructuring seniority and rate impediments to transfer).
220. See, e.g., Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974)
(describing segregation of the workplace and finding education and testing
requirements, seniority, posting, and bidding procedures disproportionately excluded
African-Americans from predominantly white sectors of the workplace); Johnson, 491
F.2d at 1368-69 (describing workplace segregation and finding education and testing
requirements served to maintain that segregation).
221. See, e.g., Melendez v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 79 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding
successful challenge to employer's use of cognitive ability test); Green v. Town of
Hamden, 73 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Conn. 1999) (challenging employer's use of written
examination); Fickling v. N.Y. State Dep't. of Civil Serv., 909 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (same).
222. See, e.g., Thomas v. Wash. County Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 926 (4th Cir. 1990)
(requiring posting of job openings and elimination of nepotism); N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d
at 378 (requiring circulation of job orders to ensure equality of notice); United States
v. Ga. Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1973) (requiring change in word-ofmouth hiring practices to "break through the currently circumscribed web of
information"); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 36,
AFL-CIO, 416 F.2d 123, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1969) (requiring additional means to
publicize union apprenticeship training programs).
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provides a relatively immediate way of increasing diversity in
applicant pools. Remedial success does not depend, in other words,
on influencing individual decision makers in ways that minimize
reliance on discriminatory biases.
Similarly, outcome goals and affirmative action plans have served as
effective methods of directly opening workplace opportunities for
minorities and women; they do not, however, alter the specific
organizational structures or institutional practices that may continue
to enable ongoing discrimination within the workplace. In fact,
affirmative action plans are typically designed to redress past unlawful
discrimination (or its present effects) against women or minorities by
requiring or permitting consideration of race or sex in allocating job
opportunities.2 23 Affirmative action does not alter the underlying
structures of decision making or prevailing definitions of merit in ways
that will reduce discrimination in the future; at best, it attempts to
offset discrimination in future decision making by identifying race or
sex as a positive factor to be given some degree of weight.224
Unlike the institutional reform efforts of recent cases, none of these
earlier measures is specifically aimed at influencing the decision
making of individuals and groups in the workplace, for the problem of
discrimination has not been defined in terms of subtle biases and
entrenched stereotypes operating in individuals and groups through
institutionalized practices and decision-making structures. Over the
past several decades, discrimination has been confined largely to a
problem of conscious motivation, a search for bad actors that neglects
the more subtle organizational influences on everyday decision
making.225 Measures that increase the representation of women and
minorities in top positions might result in a long-term benefit of fewer
decisions based on discriminatory bias, for as women and minorities
achieve a critical mass within the workplace, there is reason to believe
that the power structure will shift and certain forms of bias will
become less prevalent.2 6 However, the remedies devised in earlier
223. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
224. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616
(1987) (involving affirmative action plan that attempted to offset inequity in system
rather than efforts to invoke change in the system itself). For this reason, affirmative
action has been criticized as implicitly legitimizing biased selection processes that
define merit along racial and gender lines. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The
Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953
(1996).
225. See Green, supra note 1 (discussing need for a conceptualization of
discrimination that accounts for the more subtle operation of discrimination on a dayto-day basis in workplace dynamics).
226. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (1977)
(exploring the dynamics of tokenism as it affected women in corporate America); id.
at 281-82 (suggesting "batching" as means of reducing the impact of tokenism); see
also Elizabeth Chambliss & Christopher Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms:
Reevaluating Kanter's Legacy, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 41 (2000) (reviewing research
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Title VII lawsuits were not framed with this secondary influence on
individual decision making in mind.
Recent Title VII class actions, on the other hand, seek to identify
organizational sources of harm and to formulate remedies that will
reduce the incidence of discriminatory bias in everyday decision
making. Some of the more straightforward, traditional structural
reform remedies do surface in recent cases. For example, as part of its
consent decree, Home Depot agreed to create a computerized system
for disseminating information about open positions.227 Like earlier
institutional reform efforts, this systemic change should have a direct
effect on the number of women who are aware of and willing to apply
for open positions. However, recent cases also reflect more complex
efforts to remedy organizational sources of ongoing discrimination.
The Home Depot consent decree, for example, required managers to
interview at least three applicants for each position and to follow
structured interview questions in the interview process. 228 These
measures are arguably designed to control discriminatory bias,
whether subtle or overt, in managerial decision making. Similarly, in
the Coca-Cola consent decree, Coca-Cola agreed to hire an industrial
psychologist to undertake a review of the company's human resources
practices, part of an effort to uncover entrenched organizational
sources of bias against African-Americans.2 29
Even when earlier courts faced allegations of discrimination
involving subjectivity in decision-making systems, they tended to
conceptualize the problem in terms that led to relatively clear-cut
solutions. To some courts, subjectivity was a mask for intentional
discrimination on the part of the employer and its employees; to
others, subjectivity was a problem of employer resort to unnecessary
employment practices that had a disparate impact on blacks.23 ° In line
with either of these views, solutions in these early cases tended to
focus on the elimination of the subjective requirement altogether23 or
on the replacement of subjective evaluations with objectifiable,
specified criteria.2 32
The problem of subjectivity in the modern workplace cannot be so
easily compartmentalized. First, it is well understood that subjectivity
concerning Kanter's theory and testing her hypothesis using data of elite law firms).
227. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
230. For a more detailed discussion of the judicial attempts to analyze claims
involving subjectivity in decision making, see Green, supra note 1, at 140-44.
231. See, e.g., Rowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 361 (5th Cir. 1972)
(endorsing a proposed decree providing that the employer would not require
recommendation of immediate supervisor for promotion).
232. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 377 (8th Cir. 1973)
(ordering-,foreman selection based on merit "as judged by reasonably objective
written standards").
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cannot be entirely eliminated, particularly in higher-end jobs.233
Second, subjectivity in the modern workplace is increasingly a
problem of cognition and unconscious motivation than of conscious
intent. Rather than serving as a mask for intentional discrimination,
subjectivity in the modern workplace is problematic for its failure to
place constraints on the operation of more subtle forms of
discriminatory bias. 234 There will always be some workplace decisions
that are driven by express animus or desire to exclude, but evidence
suggests that modern-day organizations do not subscribe to
decentralized, subjective decision-making systems to discriminate; nor
do most individuals set out to discriminate when working within these
systems. 235 Rather, discrimination takes place within these systems
because workers are influenced more subtly on a day-to-day basis by
forms of cognitive and motivational bias that are left unchecked by
highly subjective decision making. Studies suggest that ambiguous
criteria are more likely to lead to decisions that rely on stereotypes,2 36
and that discriminatory bias tends to influence perception and
judgment when decision makers are not required to articulate the
reasons for their decisions and when they lack the time and/or
attention to consider the role that their biases may play in those
decisions.2 37
Subjectivity in decision making in the modern workplace must be
seen as part of a larger problem of organizational influence on
decisions made by individuals and groups. Litigants in recent cases
continue to lean toward formalization of practices and criteria, and

233. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95
Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1982) (calling for validation of selection systems in higher-end
jobs, but recognizing that new validation techniques may be necessary). There is also
reason to believe that subjectivity is becoming more prevalent in lower-end jobs as
the market shifts from blue-collar to information-based jobs and employers focus on
skill sets and customer satisfaction rather than on quantifiable job tasks. See Green,
supra note 1, at 100-05.
234. See Green, supra note 1, at 95-100 (describing a shift in the nature of
discrimination); Krieger, supra note 1; Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the
Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some PreliminaryObservations, 1 U. Pa. J. Lab. &
Emp. L. 639 (1998).
235. Studies document a shift in expressed public attitude from overt racism and
sexism to an endorsement of egalitarian values. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel
L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences,
and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism, supra
note 2, at 3-8 (summarizing findings of studies based on responses to public opinion
polls and surveys from 1940s to late 1970s); Reskin, supra note 45, at 249 (citing
studies reflecting change in attitude concerning sex equality).
236. See supra note 35.
237. See Heilman, supra note 35, at 14-15; Reskin, supra note 45, at 325-26.
Research suggests that automatic use of stereotypes can be controlled, but only with
motivation, effort, and attention. See Operario & Fiske, supra note 5, at 43-44; see
also Valian, supra note 6, at 308-09 (discussing studies suggesting that attention and
accountability are important for reducing bias in evaluation).
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some research supports movement in that direction, 238 but
formalization alone is not the answer. 3 9 Rather, in order to resolve
the problem of discrimination enabled by subjective decision-making
systems, subjectivity needs to be understood as a contextual problem
that depends on cultural and structural variables that may vary from
institution to institution. In some contexts, subjectivity in decision
making may be particularly problematic, while in other contexts it
may not.

It is possible to overstate the precision of the delineation between
early Title VII reform efforts and those of recent cases, for some

earlier cases evince more complex efforts at institutional reform,24 °

and some recent cases arguably do not go far enough in recognizing
the need for identifying and remedying organizational sources of
discrimination in the modern workplace.24' Nonetheless, recent class

action lawsuits represent an important trend toward recognizing and
attempting to address organizational and structural influences on
continuing discrimination in the workplace. At the same time,
however, the complexity of the problem of institutionally enabled

discrimination requires an equally complex, contextual remedial
process for devising meaningful organizational reform. It requires an
understanding of the culture of the particular organization as well as

its decision-making structures, and it requires an understanding of
social science research and literature on the processes of perception
and evaluation in context.
In turn, this added layer of complexity and uncertainty in remedial

formulation widens the opportunity for intermediaries to shape
change in ways that may undermine its substantive impact. As
238. See, e.g., Reskin, supra note 45, at 325 (suggesting that formalization of
evaluation criteria reduces discrimination); Valian, supra note 6, at 308-09 (discussing
studies suggesting that attention and accountability are important for reducing bias in
evaluation).
239. In fact, there is some reason to believe that if discriminatory bias can be kept
in check, movement toward a decentralized, subjective decision-making system that
values individual skills and achievements over more objective criteria like test scores
and placement on a hierarchical job ladder will result in greater advancement for
women and minorities in the workplace. See Edward S. Adams, Using Evaluations to
Break Down the Male Corporate Hierarchy: A Full Circle Approach, 73 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 117 (2002) (arguing that use of full-circle evaluations may be helpful to women
in the corporate sector); Green, supra note 1, at 104-08 (describing corporate
movement toward flexible, decentralized, subjective decision making and considering
possible benefits to minorities and women).
240. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 619, 626
(5th Cir. 1983) (affirming district court's award of injunctive relief for discriminatory
channeling in which the court appointed a special master to structure a plan for
institutional reform that included validation of job criteria as well as the institution of
guidelines for discretionary decision making).
241. Attempts to objectify criteria, for example, like in the American Express
Consent Decree, see supra note 123 and accompanying text, will fall short of
addressing the organizational problems unless attention is also paid to larger cultural
influences at play in definitions of success and evaluation of merit.
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compliance requirements become increasingly vague and contextual,
and the relationship between reform efforts and the substantive aim
of reducing workplace discrimination less direct, intermediaries
become more influential, their solutions more difficult to monitor. 42
Professionals may seize upon certain types of organizational change,
such as provision of diversity training, and employers may be willing
to implement those changes as compliance mechanisms without the
required corresponding commitment to implementation that actually
reduces the incidence of discrimination in the workplace. Finding
their way into consent decrees, these compliance measures gain an
imprimatur of public legitimacy. Moreover, other organizations are
likely to adopt similar measures without undertaking a contextualized
inquiry about problems particular to their own workplaces. 243 Over
time, courts may shape the law around the types of professionally and
organizationally accepted institutional changes that symbolize efforts
to rid more entrenched forms of discrimination from their workplaces
without actually doing so.
2. Private Nature of the Problem-Solving Process
The increased risk of private co-option by intermediaries of larger
public antidiscrimination goals through adoption of symbolic rather
than substantive reform may be exacerbated by the private nature of
the problem-solving process involved in recent lawsuits. Private
resolution of these lawsuits, with plaintiffs represented by private
attorney firms and remedial formulation by negotiated settlement,
facilitates the sort of flexible, interactive, ongoing process needed for
development of contextualized solutions. At the same time, however,
it removes the problem-solving process almost entirely from public
view.
In several recent articles, Professor Susan Sturm describes the way
in which lawyers have begun to blur the boundaries between
plaintiffs' lawyers and organizational consultants.2 " One of the firms
242. See Edelman et al., supra note 204, at 407 ("The more ambiguous and
politically contested the law, the more open it is to social construction."); see also
Edelman, supra note 200, at 1536-38 (pointing to ambiguity of Title VII law as a
factor that widens opportunity for organizational mediation).
The focus on
procedural changes rather than changes in substantive outcome also makes it more
difficult to discern whether organizational reforms are meaningful. See id. at 1538.
243. Rather than competing for the best, contextually specific resolution of the
problem, research suggests that organizations tend to develop isomorphically, seeking
legitimacy through adoption of apparently successful compliance strategies of other
organizations in their fields. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational
Fields, in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis 63 (Walter W. Powell
& Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Edelman, supra note 200, at 1545-46.
244. Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practiceof Workplace Equity, 2002 Wis. L. Rev.
277; Sturm, supra note 108, at 527-30.
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that represented the plaintiffs in the Home Depot West Coast
Division litigation has traditionally specialized in plaintiffs'
discrimination cases (one of the lead partners at the firm, Barry
Goldstein, is a former attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund).245 In addition to representing plaintiffs in class action lawsuits
like Home Depot, the firm has been retained by companies who are
potential defendants in similar litigation. 246 These companies, seeking
to improve their selection practices and to avoid employment
discrimination lawsuits, hire Goldstein's firm for an evaluation of
practices and advice.
Sometimes, according to Sturm, this
arrangement with corporations is made as part of an out-of-court
settlement of potential class action litigation.24 7 Much like the consent
decrees in recent cases, the plaintiffs' law firm in these cases is
appointed with oversight and implementation authority, retained by
the corporation "to advise the Company regarding compliance [with
the] Agreement and to participate in the confidential fact finding and
resolution process... with the goal of ensuring [the company] that it
has in fact complied with [the] Agreement., 24" Both the firms and the
249
original potential plaintiffs waive conflict of interest claims.
Sturm's work highlights the importance of an antidiscrimination
problem-solving process that encourages collaboration
and
information exchange among not only lawyers, but also professional
networks and employee groups, executives, and managers within the
organizations or industries being reformed.2 10 Because the solutions
to institutionally enabled discrimination must be tailored to the
specific enterprises and cultures of organizations, their success
requires an ongoing analysis of patterns and in-depth consideration of
context and decision-making practices that is not easily performed by
the courts or other outside regulatory entities. In this way, recent
private class action lawsuits like those that I have described represent
an important trend toward complex problem solving aimed at
organizational change in response to the threat of legal sanction and
the strength of social norms associated with Title VII without judicial
inhibition of flexible, contextualized solutions.
On the other hand, the private nature of the remedial formulation
process in these recent lawsuits raises concern about the potential of
private co-option of larger public antidiscrimination goals. Private
intermediaries may settle upon implementation of symbolic change
without substantive reform of the larger organizational practices and
245. See Sturm. supra note 244, at 299-300.
246. See id. at 301-04.
247. See id. at 304.
248. See Sturm, supra note 108, at 529-30 n.264 (quoting Saperstein, Goldstein,
Demchack, & Bailer Settlement and Release).
249. See id. at 529.
250. See id. at 524-35 (describing the role of various intermediaries in devising
solutions).
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cultures that continue to facilitate discrimination in the workplace.
These private intermediaries are often driven by financial and other
self-interested incentives that may conflict with larger public
antidiscrimination goals.
Moreover, the organizational changes
embodied in consent decrees obtain the imprimatur of public
oversight through court approval without any real assurance that the
public's interest in reducing discrimination in the workplace is being
served.
A preliminary concern stems from the increased involvement of the
private bar in representing plaintiffs in discrimination class action
lawsuits.25 ' The possibility of large money damage awards since the
1991 amendments increases the likelihood both that private firms will
take on employment discrimination class actions and that some firms
will view employment discrimination class actions primarily in
monetary terms.2 52 Without the institutional commitment to civil
rights enforcement and nondiscrimination of earlier public interest
groups, these private law firms may lack the incentive to invest the
resources needed for devising the type of long-term institutional
reform needed for meaningful change. Moreover, the difficulty in
attaching monetary value to institutional reform means that private
attorneys may be tempted to compromise organizational change for
larger money settlement funds with the hope of signaling greater
success and leading to judicial approval of larger attorneys' fees.253
Even if we are confident that private firms can adequately represent
the interests of a non-monetary subclass in these cases, the type of
organizational reform obtained may focus on short-term gains for
members of the plaintiff class rather than long-term change, leaving in
place the organizational practices, structures, and cultures that led to
the discrimination in the first place.
Perhaps most important, however, the private nature of the
resolution process in recent cases provides little foundation upon
which to build an understanding of organizational sources of
discrimination and possible methods of reform. We have no way of
knowing, without judicial inquiry or other public safeguards, whether
251. Professor Sturm identifies without resolution this problem of accountability
raised by the relationships that she describes. See Sturm, supra note 200, at 305-07.
She locates accountability for a firm like Saperstein, Goldstein primarily in its
reputation in the historical and professional community, but, as she concedes,
reputation will not provide the same accountability for "less visible lawyers with
fewer long-standing relationships to the advocacy community." See id. at 305-06.
252. This is not to say that no private law firm will be motivated by a commitment
to nondiscrimination. Indeed, the line between public interest firms and private firms
is not always clear. See Katz & Bernabei, supra note 132.
253. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that attorney fees
cannot be based on a percentage of a common fund that includes a monetary
valuation of injunctive relief. See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003).
For several proposals aimed at checking fee abuse in employment discrimination class
actions, see Selmi, supra note 129, at 1328-30.
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the reforms implemented pursuant to recent consent decrees are
supported by social scientific research or even derive from a contextspecific evaluation of the workplace instituting change. And yet, the
basic compliance mechanisms laid out in recent consent decrees may,
before long, become accepted as ways of satisfying Title VII's
nondiscrimination obligation. Without public oversight that provides
some assurance that these changes are meaningful rather than merely
symbolic, we may find widespread implementation of types of
organizational change that make no actual headway in eliminating the
structural, cultural, and institutionally systemic sources of ongoing
workplace discrimination.
B. Possible Safeguards

There is no obvious answer to this tension in devising solutions for
reform of organizational sources of discrimination, with the need for
private flexibility on the one hand, and the need for public
accountability on the other. Drawing on experience in the public law
arena, it seems clear that the complexity of the task of remedial
formulation in most of these cases will mean that courts are ill-suited
to provide either detailed decrees imposing organizational change or
extensive substantive review of changes proposed by parties. 4 It may
be necessary, however, for courts to play more than a wholly
deferential role. 55 Courts can serve as important public safeguards in
Title VII reform litigation even when the specific details of reform are
devised by private intermediaries and embodied in consent rather
than judicial decrees.
At the outset, the complexity of the remedial task raises the
question whether courts should be involved at all in formulating or
even reviewing detailed prospective injunctive relief that seeks to
reduce organizational sources of discrimination. One might argue
that monetary damage awards, together with generalized prohibitions
against discrimination, should serve as adequate incentive for selfstudy and organizational change to be undertaken by employers in
254. In most institutional reform litigation, courts place some degree of
responsibility for devising solutions in the hands of the parties; the degree to which
the parties, particularly the defendants, are given responsibility for remedial
formulation tends to vary according to degree of cooperation and capability. See
Chayes, supra note 215, at 1298-302 (describing judicial role in public law litigation);
Special Project,supra note 197, at 797-813 (discussing judicial approaches to remedial
formulation in various institutional reform contexts). Professor Colin Diver likens
institutional reform litigation to a bargaining process, with the judge as the "political
powerbroker." See Diver, supra note 216.
255. Although I focus here more discretely on the role of the courts as a means of
public oversight in lawsuits like those recently filed, non-legal avenues for effecting
meaningful change may also exist. See, e.g., Restorative Justice and Civil Society
(Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2001) (exploring the potential of restorative
justice to reduce crime).
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these types of cases. 6 There are several reasons, however, why more
directed institutional reform efforts are needed. On a political level,
reliance solely on money damages tends to bury rather than to
highlight the importance of organizational sources of discrimination in
the modern workplace. To the extent that the law operates to frame
public debate and ongoing conversation about broader social
problems, it seems important to focus directly on the ways in which
5 7
organizational change can affect the incidence of discrimination.
On a practical level, moreover, taking the judiciary out of the process
of structural remedial formulation does little to reduce the risk of
adopting symbolic over meaningful reform. In the area of hostile
work environment law, for example, courts and litigants have focused
primarily on remedies that take monetary form,258 leaving to
employers the task of devising forward-looking solutions to the
problem of workplace harassment; yet, in this area mechanisms have
developed that signal legal compliance without necessarily effecting
environmental change.259 Similarly, reliance on money damages in
cases like those recently brought would serve to remove the
imprimatur of legitimacy that attaches to judicial involvement in
remedial formulation or approval, but at the same time it would leave
in place the organizational sources of discrimination without any
assurance that organizations would undertake the task of evaluation
and problem solving needed for meaningful change.26 °
256. The Supreme Court has suggested that monetary awards are intended to deter
future conduct as well as compensate for past conduct. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977):
[A] primary objective of Title VII is prophylactic: to achieve equal
employment opportunity and to remove the barriers that have operated to
favor white male employees over other employees. The prospect of
retroactive relief for victims of discrimination serves this purpose by
providing the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to selfexamine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of their discriminatory
practices.
Id. at 364 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
257. There is some reason to believe that by introducing a new causal story, the law
may influence behavior indirectly through creation of new social norms as well as
directly through imposition of liability. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal
Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Or. L. Rev. 339 (2000) (describing the process through
which law can influence behavior by causing individuals to update beliefs about social
approval); Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas,
104 Pol. Sci. Q. 281 (1989) (placing causal argument at the heart of the political
problem definition); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 2021 (1996) (exploring the role of law in controlling behavior indirectly
through expression of norms).
258. The 1991 amendments authorizing compensatory and punitive damages were
the result, in part, of concern about the inadequacy of existing remedies for victims of
a hostile work environment. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 64-74 (1991), reprintedin
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,602-12.
259. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of self-
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Accepting the need for some judicial involvement in overseeing the
formation of structural reform embodied in remedial consent decrees,
the task then becomes one of shaping a proper judicial role. In the
past, concerns about the public law remedial process have focused on

the issue of participation, emphasizing the court's role in ensuring
adequate representation of all interested groups.261 Formulation of
the precise means of institutional reform will often implicate divergent
interests within the beneficiary, minority group as well as emergent
interests of the majority group, interests that were not triggered in the
same way by a determination of liability. 26 2
Accordingly, as
commentators have emphasized, participation of various interest
groups in formulating a remedy in the institutional reform context is
crucial to the design of fair and effective methods of change.
Participation and adequacy of representation remain equally
important to modern Title VII institutional reform efforts, but the
increased potential for private co-option of larger public
antidiscrimination goals in recent litigation suggests the need for a
judicial role that extends beyond facilitation of participation. In
addition to facilitating participation of various interests, courts
reviewing consent decrees like those proposed in recent cases might
take on a role as public safeguard, guiding institutional reform in ways
that increase the likelihood that proposed and implemented reforms
will actually reduce the incidence of workplace discrimination rather
than merely signal Title VII compliance without any real change in
evaluation and the entrenched nature of organizational sources that make unlikely
meaningful employer response to market forces). In fact, in a recent article, Professor
Michael Selmi presents a statistical study that suggests that recent monetary awards
have little financial deterrent effect. Selmi, supra note 96, at 1258-68.
261. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent
Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 579 (emphasizing
the judge's role in protecting the rights of absent class members); Susan P. Sturm, The
Promise of Participation,78 Iowa L. Rev. 981 (1993) (proposing a nonadversarial
approach to participation in the institutional reform remedial context); Special
Project, supra note 197, at 78 (detailing concerns about the adequacy of
representation in the institutional reform context and proposing a new approach to
participation).
262. The Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Wilks, as well as the congressional
response to that decision in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to a large extent reflect this
concern about non-party interests in the formulation and implementation of
structural reform. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that third parties
affected by terms of a consent decree may challenge the terms of the decree as
unlawful under Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(1)(B) (2000) (limiting challenges to
employment practices implementing litigated or consent judgments in circumstances
where the objecting non-party had notice of the judgment and a reasonable
opportunity to present objections or where that non-party's interests were adequately
represented). See generally Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure:
Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees,
77 Cornell L. Rev. 189 (1992); Sturm, supra note 261. The beneficiary group's
interests may also diverge when it comes to formulation of structural reform. See
Schwarzschild, supra note 133, at 909-10 (discussing interests at stake in negotiation of
structural consent decrees).
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organizational sources of discrimination. To this end, an inquiry into
the fairness of a proposed remedial plan should include consideration

of whether the particular reforms suggested will have some
meaningful impact on the incidence of discrimination.
There are a variety of ways in which courts could satisfy this
obligation. At the very least, courts should require the parties to

present reasons for particular reform strategies that are supported by
social scientific and/or organizational research on the operation of

discrimination and on study of the particular workplace context at
issue. This would mean as a practical matter that in most cases the
parties would hire experts to review the relevant social science and
organizational research and to provide a particularized evaluation of
the employer's workplace, and that the parties would present the
findings of these experts in publicly available court documents.263

Such a requirement, without locking employers into specific reform
efforts or placing courts in a position of extensive substantive review
of chosen programs, would encourage a response to organizationally

enabled

discrimination

that

takes

into

account

particular

organizational context and would provide a much-needed foundation
for intermediary, if not public, discussion and debate.
Courts might also require the appointment of panels of individuals
external to the organization and knowledgeable in the fields of
organizational change and discrimination dynamics to oversee and

monitor implementation of reform measures, thereby encouraging
knowledge-based reform measures and minimizing the risk of
organizational co-option in implementation.264 Several consent
decrees in recent cases, including the Coca Cola consent decree, have
provided for external panel oversight of remedial implementation.2 65

Many,

however,

have

not,

instead

assigning

implementation

responsibility to a single court-appointed master or to a group or
single individual within the organization.26 6 Moreover, even external
263. Of course, social science evidence is not conclusive. For that reason, the court
should require support to encourage debate and discussion about proper reform
efforts rather than to identify uniform reform measures that will necessarily effectuate
meaningful change across organizational settings.
264. See Chambliss, supra note 94, at 20-34 (describing difficult bind in which
internal equal employment opportunity officers find themselves).
265. The consent decrees in the Texaco and Coca Cola cases each required
appointment of a panel with some members external to the organization to oversee
implementation. See Thomas S. Mulligan & Chris Kraul, Texaco Settles Race Bias Suit
for $176 Million, L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1996, at Al (discussing details of Texaco
consent decree); supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing details of Coca
Cola consent decree).
266. See, e.g., Heather Bodell, Sex Discrimination:Grocery Chain Starts Complying
with Terms of $16 Million Settlement of Sex Bias Suit, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A7
(June 17, 1999), available at LEXIS, News Library, DLR File (noting Ingles Markets
decree requiring the creation of a human resources committee on the board of
directors and the appointment of an internal compliance official); Aswad, supra note
106 (Home Depot decree requiring internal positions for monitoring implementation);
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panels should be designed to include and/or encourage consultation of
organizational and social scientific experts who can provide advice on
directions for meaningful change.26 7
In some circumstances, courts might also tie a percentage of
attorneys fees to some showing of long-term substantive outcome,
providing an incentive for attorneys to devise meaningful
organizational solutions in addition to achieving substantial individual
monetary awards. A similar check on class counsel incentives has
been proposed in the mass tort context in cases involving coupon
settlements. 68 There, some courts have required that class counsel
fees be based in part on the amount of coupon redemption within a
specified period. 269 Although there may be lingering difficulties with
evaluating substantive change in the discrimination context, this or a
similar approach of tying attorney fees to substantive results would
serve to better align the class counsel's financial interest with the class
members' and the public's interest in meaningful organizational
reform.270

Finally, recognizing the potential limits of courts in assessing the
substance of proposed programs for reform and the less-thanadversarial nature of the relationship between the parties on
presentation of a consent decree to the court for approval, nonjudicial public oversight should be encouraged. The EEOC, for
example, may have a significant role to play in reviewing programs for
reform.2 7'
Agency review of recent social scientific evidence,
production of basic problem-solving protocols, and, perhaps most

important, intervention in privately-instituted litigation on behalf of
the public interest are all ways in which the EEOC could provide
Consent Decree, supra note 118.
267. Instead of rubber-stamping employer efforts, external panels must be required
to provide independent review and guidance regarding organizational change. The
external task forces in recent cases have been criticized as "little more than a public
relations cheerleader." Selmi, supra note 96, at 1324.
268. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Agency Problem: Some Procedural
Suggestions, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 359 (1997); Note, In-Kind Class Action
Settlements, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 810 (1996); see also Christopher R. Leslie, A MarketBased Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action
Litigation, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 991 (2002) (proposing a variation in which attorneys
would be paid in coupons). Proposed changes to Rule 23 contemplate a waiting
period for payment of attorneys fees in some class action settlements. See
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) Advisory
Committee Notes (2003) (submitted to Congress March 2003).
269. See, e.g., Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 989 F. Supp. 375 (D.
Mass. 1997), affd, 183 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (postponing or "staging" fee award).
270. For additional proposals concerning attorney fees in recent employment class
action lawsuits, see Selmi, supra note 96, at 1328-30.
271. Of course, the EEOC is also an active intermediary in the mediation of law
with its own institutional interests and political limits. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note
207, at 25 (noting EEOC's role in promoting diversity training); Sturm, supra note
108, at 550-53 (discussing challenges facing administrative agencies in developing
structural solutions to modern employment discrimination problems).
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some oversight without hampering the flexibility of the private
problem-solving process.272 Similarly, public interest groups should be

permitted to present objections to programs for reform, alerting the
court to areas in which the parties may be providing signals of
compliance without real efforts at meaningful reform. By expanding
the locus of responsibility for oversight in this way, courts can
facilitate substantive review of proposed reforms without themselves

becoming experts in social science or organizational research.
All of these measures would aim to provide public safeguards for

institutional reforms undertaken pursuant to consent decrees without
inhibiting the flexibility of the private problem-solving process driving
recent Title VII case resolutions. The key to meaningful Title VII-

triggered institutional reform in these cases lies in a multi-disciplinary
effort to uncover ways in which employers can best devise and

implement structural changes that reduce ongoing discrimination in
their workplaces. Social and organizational scientists, governmental
agencies, public interest groups, private litigants, and private law firms

are each valuable players in the problem-solving process needed for
the type of institutional change sought in recent cases, but the court
plays a facilitative and oversight role that must be taken seriously if
these lawsuits are to effect meaningful rather than merely symbolic

institutional reform.
CONCLUSION

Individuals simply do not make decisions in isolation. Whether
NASA managers deciding to launch the space shuttle Challenger, or
financial services firm managers deciding whom to favor for valuable
client leads, individuals are influenced by the social and organizational
contexts within which they live and work. Accordingly, it makes sense
272. See Gender: Tentative $47 Million Sex Bias Agreement at Rent-A-Center
Supersedes Earlier Decree, 18 Emp. Discrim. Rep. 306 (BNA) (2002), available at
LEXIS, News Library, Emp. Discrim. Rep. File (private settlement agreement
replaced by new agreement after EEOC objection); Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco to Let
U.S. Monitor Bias-Law Compliance, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1997, at A36 (settlement
agreement between Texaco and EEOC provides EEOC with monitoring authority
after EEOC attempt to intervene to object to private settlement). Title VII provides
that the court may permit the EEOC to intervene in a civil action "upon certification
that the case is of general public importance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000). Some
courts in recent cass, however, have denied the EEOC's request to intervene. See,
e.g., Race Discrimination:Judge Rejects EEOC's Intervention Request in Race Bias
Case Against Lockheed Martin, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A2 (Feb. 26, 2001),
available at LEXIS, News Library, DLR File. Moreover, some commentators have
suggested that the EEOC should limit interventions. See, e.g., Nancy Krieter, Equal
Employment Opportunity: EEOC and OFCCP,in Rights at Risk: Equality in an Age
of Terrorism 153 (2002), available at http://www.cccr.org/reports.html (last visited on
October 16, 2003); EEOC: Fawell Questions EEOC Litigation Strategy, Reasons to
Intervene in High-Profile Cases, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D17 (Apr. 10, 1997), at
D17, available at LEXIS, News Library, DLR File (Congressman Harris Fawell
questions EEOC intervention policies).
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to recognize that modern workplace discrimination is a problem of
organizational as well as individual dimensions. Attempts to identify
and punish discrete bad actors without attention to larger
organizational context will not resolve the problem of workplace
discrimination, for these efforts leave in place the structures, cultures,
and practices that may have facilitated that discrimination in the first
place.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act holds the capacity to trigger change
in the organizational structures, cultures, and taken-for-granted
institutionalized practices that continue to engender unequal
treatment in the workplace. And yet, as I have argued, realization of
that capacity requires careful attention to the tools available for
addressing all sources of discrimination and to the processes for
Private class action
devising meaningful programs for reform.
lawsuits like those recently brought represent an important trend in
the antidiscrimination project, a shift away from individualization of
the antidiscrimination inquiry and toward an inquiry that includes
broader organizational as well as individual sources of discrimination.
Once understood as attempts to identify and address organizational
sources of discrimination, these lawsuits fit nicely within the existing
class action paradigm, for the organizational cause of the
discrimination, rather than the precise nature of the injury suffered,
forms the common question for the class. At the same time, however,
these cases raise particular concern about the potential for co-option
of public antidiscrimination goals by private intermediaries that will
result in symbolic change without any meaningful reduction in the
incidence of ongoing discrimination. As the law develops in light of
compliance mechanisms devised by private intermediaries, there is a
risk that we will come full circle to a legal inquiry that fails to address
organizational sources of discrimination in any meaningful way.
These concerns, however, should not serve as a barrier to recent
enforcement efforts; rather, they should serve as a starting point for
the type of interdisciplinary research and in-depth academic, judicial,
and professional conversation needed for devising contextual
programs for meaningful institutional reform.

